SoK: Certified Robustness for Deep Neural Networks by Li, Linyi et al.
SoK: Certified Robustness for Deep Neural
Networks
Linyi Li∗ Xiangyu Qi† Tao Xie‡ and Bo Li∗
∗ University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, {linyi2,lbo}@illinois.edu
† Zhejiang University, unispac@zju.edu.cn
‡ Peking University, taoxie@pku.edu.cn
Abstract—Great advancement in deep neural networks (DNNs)
has led to state-of-the-art performance on a wide range of tasks.
However, recent studies have shown that DNNs are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks, which have brought great concerns when
deploying these models to safety-critical applications such as
autonomous driving. Different defense approaches have been
proposed against adversarial attacks, including: 1) empirical
defenses, which can be adaptively attacked again without provid-
ing robustness certification; and 2) certifiably robust approaches,
which consist of robustness verification providing the lower bound
of robust accuracy against any attacks under certain conditions
and corresponding robust training approaches. In this paper, we
focus on these certifiably robust approaches and provide the
first work to perform large-scale systematic analysis of different
robustness verification and training approaches. In particular, we
1) provide a taxonomy for the robustness verification and training
approaches, as well as discuss the detailed methodologies for
representative algorithms, 2) reveal the fundamental connections
among these approaches, 3) discuss current research progresses,
theoretical barriers, main challenges, and several promising
future directions for certified defenses for DNNs, and 4) provide
an open-sourced unified platform to evaluate 20+ representative
verification and corresponding robust training approaches on a
wide range of DNNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning techniques, especially deep neural net-
works (DNNs), have been widely adopted in various appli-
cations, such as image classification [62, 50, 107], natural
language processing [115, 29, 13], and robotics [99, 100]. How-
ever, despite their wide applications, recent studies [106, 46]
have shown that DNNs are vulnerable to the carefully crafted
adversarial attacks such as adversarial examples — inputs with
adversarial perturbation added that could mislead DNNs to
make arbitrarily incorrect predictions [4, 12]. The existence
of adversarial attacks leads to great safety concerns for DNN
based applications, especially in the safety-critical scenarios
such as autonomous driving.
Different types of adversarial attacks have been proposed
so far [4, 12, 46, 18, 125, 23, 77]. To defend against
these attacks, there are several work proposed to improve the
robustness of neural networks [84, 97, 77, 14, 48]. However,
many of such defenses can be adaptively attacked again by
sophisticated attackers [4, 113]. The everlasting competition
between attackers and defenders motivates studies on the
certifiably robust approaches for DNNs, which include both
robustness verification and robust training approaches (e.g.
[24, 60, 102, 104, 117, 122, 128]). The robustness verification
approaches aim to provide the theoretically certified lower
bound of robustness under certain perturbation properties, such
as the magnitude of perturbations. The corresponding robust
training approaches aim to train neural networks in order to
improve such lower bound of robustness.
In this paper, we focus on recent research in certified
robustness for DNNs, including both verification and robust
training approaches. We provide the first systematic taxonomy
for the certifiably robust approaches, enabling researchers to
further inspect each approach in details and understand their
fundamental connections. In particular, we discuss both the de-
terministic verification and emerging probabilistic verification
approaches for neural networks, along with the corresponding
robust training approaches.
We develop an open-sourced unified platform for the repre-
sentative verification and training approaches. 1 Empirically, we
benchmark over 20 verification and robust training approaches
for comparison. 2 As far as we know, it is the first large-scale
benchmark on the certified robustness for neural networks.
Based on the taxonomy, analysis, and benchmark of existing
approaches, we further provide discussion and analysis on
current research progresses, theoretical barriers (including a
proposed one), and several promising future directions in
certified robustness.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We provide the first taxonomy of certifiably robust
approaches for neural networks, including both robustness
verification and corresponding robust training approaches.
• We conduct comprehensive theoretical analysis and exten-
sive empirical comparisons for different state-of-the-art
approaches on robustness verification and training.
• We discuss and analyze current research progresses,
theoretical barriers (including a new theoretic result),
and challenges of current certifiably robust approaches.
We further provide several potential future directions of
certified robustness.
• We provide an open-sourced unified evaluation platform
for over 20 verification and training approaches, which
we believe will facilitate the development and evaluation
of research on certified robustness for DNNs.
1The platform is open-sourced at https://github.com/AI-secure/VeriGauge.
2In addition, we maintain the leaderboard of state-of-the-art certified
robustness at https://github.com/AI-secure/Provable-Training-and-Verification-
Approaches-Towards-Robust-Neural-Networks.
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II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will introduce the basic notations and
important preliminary concepts.
A. Notations
We denote [n] as set {1, 2, . . . , n}. To express the region
of adversarial perturbation, when measured by Lp norm, we
use Bp,(x0) to denote the corresponding ball centered at
x0 with  radius, i.e., Bp,(x0) := {x : ‖x − x0‖p ≤ }.
For matrix M, the M+ := max{M, 0} is the elementwise
positively filtered matrix, and the M− := min{M, 0} is
corresponding negatively filtered matrix. The function Φ(·)
is the cumulative density function (CDF) of standard normal
distribution N (0, 1).
We mainly focus on existing works on the classification task
with neural networks. Specifically, a large portion of existing
approaches mainly consider feed-forward ReLU networks (see
Def. 1). A neural network model fθ is modeled as a function:
X 7→ RC , where the input data x ∼ D is in a bounded n-
dimensional subspace X ⊆ [0, 1]n, and the model provides con-
fidence scores for all C classes. Fθ(x) := arg maxi∈[C] fθ(x)i
is the predicted class of model fθ given input x. θ is the set of
trainable parameters for f . For brevity, we will omit θ when
there is no ambiguity. Note that common neural networks may
add a softmax layer on top of f to normalize these confidence
scores. Since it does not change the predicted class, we mainly
focus on either f(x) (refer to as logits layer in the literature)
or the final predicted label F (x).
Definition 1 (Feed-Forward ReLU Networks). An l-layer feed-
forward ReLU network fθ is defined as such:
z1 := x,
zˆi+1 :=Wizi + bi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1
zi := ReLU(zˆi), for i = 2, . . . , l
fθ(x) := zˆl,
(1)
where ReLU(z, 0) = max{z, 0}. Each zi and zˆi is a vector
in Rni . In particular, n1 = n and nl = C. The trainable
parameters θ := {Wi, bi : i ∈ [l − 1]}.
B. Threat Model
In this paper, we focus on white-box evasion attacks, which
indicates the strongest adversary who has full knowledge about
the target model including its parameters and architecture. The
attacker could craft an imperceptible perturbation to the original
input, generating a new sample known as adversarial exam-
ple [106], which fools the model to make wrong predictions.
Specifically, we mainly consider (Lp, )-adversary (Def. 2),
though other types of attacks will also be discussed briefly.
Definition 2 ((Lp, )-Adversary). For given (x0, y0), where
x0 ∈ X is the input and y0 ∈ [C] is the true label, the (Lp, )-
adversary will generate a perturbed input x ∈ Bp,(x0), such
that Fθ(x) 6= y0. (When the radius  is not of interest, we will
use Lp adversary).
The above definition conforms to untargeted attack. We
remark that targeted attack which mislead the adversarial input
to a predefined label yt can be defined similarly. In general,
different literature also refers to an (Lp, )-adversary as an
Lp-bounded attack (bounded by ).
C. Robustness Verification and Training Approaches
Robustness verification. Robustness verification certifies the
lower bound of model’s performance against any adversary
under certain conditions , e.g., L∞-bounded attack. So far, there
are two major branches of robustness verification approaches:
deterministic verification and probabilistic verification. When
the given input is non-robust against the attack, deterministic
verification approaches are guaranteed to identify this non-
robustness while the probabilistic verification approaches only
succeed with certain probability (e.g. 99.9%) where the ran-
domness is independent of input. Specifically, if the verification
approach claims x is non-robust if and only if it is indeed non-
robust we call it complete verification; otherwise incomplete
verification. See Def. 3 for formal definition. Moreover, the
robustness verification can be modeled as an optimization
problem (Problem 1).
Definition 3 (Robustness Verification). An algorithm A is
called a robustness verification approach, if for any (x0, y0), as
long as there exists x ∈ Bp,(x0) with Fθ(x) 6= y0 (adversarial
example), A(fθ, x0, y0, ) = false (deterministic verification)
or Pr[A(fθ, x0, y0, ) = false] ≥ 1 − α (probabilistic
verification), where α is a pre-defined small threshold.
By definition, a robustness verification approach A provides
a sufficient condition for model robustness. If A also provides
a necessary condition for model robustness, A is said to be
complete, otherwise incomplete.
Problem 1 (Robustness Verification as Optimization). Given a
neural network fθ : X 7→ RC , input instance x0 ∈ X , ground-
truth label y0 ∈ [C], target label yt ∈ [C] and the radius
 > 0, we define the following optimization problem:
M(y0, yt) = minimize
x
fθ(x)y0 − fθ(x)yt s.t. x ∈ Bp,(x0).
(2)
One can certify that fθ is robust at x0 within radius  w.r.t.
Lp norm, as long as M(y0, yt) ≥ 0,∀yt ∈ [C].
Based on the optimization perspective in Problem 1, if M
is exactly solved, the corresponding verification approaches
would be complete. However, although complete verification
is attractive, the optimization problem M is shown to be
NP-Complete [60], and it is even intractable to approximate
with constant approximation ratio [121]. This intrinsic barrier
impedes complete verification approaches from scaling up to
common neural network size. To overcome this scalability
challenge, the incomplete verification approaches aim to solve
the relaxed problem, i.e., by computing the lower bound of M
which is more tractable. However, the relaxations in existing
approaches are typically too loose, which induces another
problem identified as the tightness challenge. As a result, the
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tradeoff between scalability and tightness constitute the major
obstacles for robustness verification.
Robust training. We refer to a training approach as robust
training if the it either explicitly or implicitly enhances the
robustness certification. Robust training is typically related to or
derived from corresponding verification approaches. It usually
improves the certified robustness by optimizing additional
quantities such as regularization terms, certification bounds,
or by adding uncertainty during training. Robust training
ensures a non-trivial robustness certification, and it is a strong
complement for robustness verification approaches.
III. TAXONOMY OF ROBUSTNESS VERIFICATION AND
ROBUST TRAINING APPROACHES
In this section, we will first provide a taxonomy of existing
robustness verification and robust training approaches (Fig. 1),
and then discuss several representative approaches and their
connections in details.
A. Taxonomy and Overview
We present the taxonomy tree of major robustness verifi-
cation and robust training approaches in Fig. 1. Note that
the robust training approaches are placed in the taxonomy
tree alongside their closely-related verification approaches.
In addition, we present an extended summary table of these
approaches in Appendix B.
In the following subsections, we will introduce the major
verification and training approaches by category. Sections III-B
to III-E introduce deterministic approaches. Among them, Sec-
tion III-B introduces complete approaches, and Sections III-C
to III-E introduce incomplete approaches. The incomplete ap-
proaches can then be further divided into linear relaxations (Sec-
tion III-C), semi-definite programming (SDP) (Section III-D),
and Lipschitz or curvature bound (Section III-E). Section III-F
will introduce the probabilistic approaches. We label the
corresponding subsections for each category in the taxonomy
tree (Fig. 1).
To characterize the scalability of discussed verification
approaches, we measure the scalability based on the largest
model size for corresponding dataset. Models for ACAS [60]
dataset typically contain < 300 neurons; MNIST [64] —
1, 000 ∼ 10, 000 neurons; CIFAR-10 [62] — 10, 000 ∼
100, 000 neurons; and ImageNet [94] — 100, 000 ∼ 1 million
neurons. Thus, we can coarsely measure the scalability based
on the supported datasets of the verification approaches. We
observe that the scalability varies from ACAS to ImageNet.
B. Complete Verification
In this subsection, we introduce complete robustness verifica-
tion approaches, which is a branch of deterministic verification.
These approaches usually consider L∞ adversary and mainly
support feed-forward ReLU networks (see Def. 1).
Neuron Classification. Many complete verification ap-
proaches rely on the activation patterns within neural networks,
so we provide a classification of neurons for later use.
Definition 4 (Neuron Classification for Feed-Forward ReLU
Networks). Let n be a neuron in a feed-forward ReLU network.
For given input x, if the input to n is < 0, we call n inactive,
otherwise active. Let S be an input region, for any x ∈ S ⊆ X ,
if we can certify that input to n is always > 0 or ≤ 0, we call
neuron n stable with respect to region S; otherwise we call n
unstable.
Remark. When a neuron n is stable, it serves as a constant
linear mapping as y = 0 or y = x for the network.
Piecewise-Linear Property. Since each ReLU neuron outputs
ReLU(x) = max{x, 0}, it is always locally linear within some
region around input x. Since feed-forward ReLU networks are
the composition of these piecewise linear neurons and (linear)
affine mappings, the output is locally linear w.r.t input x. This
property is formally stated and proved in [58]. It serves as the
foundation for many verification approaches.
Next we will introduce different type of complete verification
approaches in detail.
1) Branch-and-Bound [38, 60, 17, 45, 118, 117]:
To solve the verification on feed-forward ReLU networks
(Def. 1), some work [87, 88] directly models it as an SMT prob-
lem, so that a complete verification could be directly performed
via an off-the-shelf SMT solver such as Z3 [28]. However such
verification is usually too slow to be practical [60].
As a more practical approach, Planet [38] adopts the
branch-and-bound strategy. The verification problem is essen-
tially a non-linear optimization problem (Problem 1), where
the main non-linearity comes from the non-linear activation
functions. Thus, they propose to first use the linear polytope
(Def. 5) to replace the ReLU activation’s non-linear constraints
at the cost of looseness, and provide a lower bound of
M(y0, yt). If the lower bound is already non-negative, then the
certification could be made. If not, we can always tighten the
relaxation by splitting an unstable (Def. 4) ReLU neuron into
two versions — always active and always inactive, i.e. splitting
the original one optimization problem into two sub-problems
by adding specific conditions and solve them respectively. Then
they will repeatedly follow this strategy in a divide-and-conquer
way, constantly tighten the relaxation until the certification is
made or all of the unstable neurons are already split where the
relaxation is totally removed.
Definition 5 (ReLU Polytope). For neuron zi,j = ReLU(zˆi,j),
let li,j and ui,j be the lower bound and upper bound of its
output when the input region is Bp,(x0):
li,j ≤ min
x∈Bp,(x0)
zˆi,j(x) ≤ max
x∈Bp,(x0)
zˆi,j(x) ≤ ui,j . (3)
Then, if li,j < 0 < ui,j , neuron zi,j = ReLU(zˆi,j) can be
bounded by linear constraints:
zi,j ≥ 0, zi,j ≥ zˆi,j , zi,j ≤ ui,j
ui,j − li,j (zˆi,j − li,j). (4)
We call this set of constraints the polytope for ReLU.
We show a polytope for ReLU in Fig. 2a. We can see that
when both li,j and ui,j are tight, the polytope is the tightest
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Fig. 1: Taxonomy tree of major robustness verification and training approaches against Lp adversary. The approaches are
clustered hierarchically based on their core methodology. The rounded boxes contain category names. The subsections where
each category approaches are introduced are shown in bold. The leaf nodes contain references of corresponding approaches,
where normal font denotes the robustness verification approaches, bold font denotes both robustness verification and training,
and italic font denotes only robust training approaches.
convex hull for this ReLU neuron. This polytope is widely
used [122, 123, 111]. An important issue regarding using this
polytope comes from computing l and u. The computation
of tight l and u is NP-complete. A practical solution is to
compute the l and u from linear relaxation of previous layers,
which yields an iterative algorithm. More discussion is in
Section III-C. Once the relaxation is used for all unstable
neurons, the constraints for the verification problem are linear.
Thus, we can use linear programming (LP) to derive the
certification.
Several improvements of Planet [38] come from better
neuron split heuristics, and tighter l and u bounds, such as
BaB [17] and BaBSR [15]. We note that Reluval [118] and
Neurify [117], though derived from different perspectives,
are similar to Planet, where the differences lie in the forms
of over-approximation and the split policies.
Similarly, AI2 [45] and Reluplex [60] also partially use
the branch-and-bound strategy. AI2 [45] maintains a limited
number of polyhedrons, which is called a type of abstract
interpretations in the paper. The polyhedrons are propagated
through the neural network layer by layer. When there are un-
stable neurons, relevant polyhedrons are split. Reluplex [60]
extends the simplex method which is widely used to solve LP
to robustness verification. Comparing with classical simplex
method, Reluplex additionally takes ReLU constraints into
account. Reluplex permits temporary violation of ReLU
specifications. In each iteration, it either fixes such violation,
or performs normal operation as in simplex method for
optimization. After a certain ReLU neuron is fixed too many
times, the neuron is split and the resulting subproblems are
solved in parallel.
All the approaches above are complete and would need ex-
ponential time in the worst-case. As for practical performance,
all approaches are evaluated and performed on small models
with small datasets like ACAS [59]. On larger datasets such
as MNIST with larger network, Planet takes several hours
per input, while Reluval, Neurify, and AI2 can solve in
reasonable time only when the model size is strictly controlled.
2) MILP-Based Approaches [38, 21, 75, 111, 127]:
Several approaches model robustness verification as a mixed
integer linear programming (MILP) problem. Unlike LP, the
MILP problem is able to model the verification without
relaxation.
Sherlock [31] leverages MILP solver to find the tightest
lower and upper bound of neuron outputs, i.e., l and u. The l
and u can be leveraged to improve the tightness of existing
verification approaches.
In Reachability [75] and ChengMIP [21], for unstable
neuron zi,j (the neuron could be both active or inactive), the
constraint of zi,j = ReLU(zˆi,j) is encoded by the following
constraints:{
zi,j ≥ 0, zi,j ≥ zˆi,j ,
zi,j ≤Mai,j , zi,j ≤ zˆi,j +Mi,j(1− ai,j), (5)
where Mi,j = max{|li,j |, |ui,j |}, and ai,j ∈ {0, 1} is the
newly introduced binary decision variable. When ai,j = 0, zi,j
is inactive; otherwise it is active. Thus the encoding precisely
expresses ReLU. In Bounded MILP [111], the encoding is
further improved by using the lower bound li,j and upper
bound ui,j separately instead of just Mi,j , which boosts the
solving process significantly in practice. Recently, Anderson
et al. [2] provide rigorous analysis and a novel and efficient
approach on modeling robustness verification using MILP.
By leveraging MILP solvers such as Gurobi [49], complete
robustness verification can be done efficiently for many robustly
trained neural networks even on large datasets such as CIFAR-
10 with models specifically trained by different approaches
[123, 47, 134]. However, the naturally trained neural networks
are still hard to be verified by these verification approaches
even on MNIST.
3) Other Approaches [52, 58]:
DLV [52] is a complex approach which propagates and back-
propagates the certified robust region layer by layer. DLV
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Fig. 2: Different linear relaxations for ReLU. (a) shows the
tightest polytope (the blue region) for ReLU which is used
in [38, 122, 123, 111]; (b) is used in Fast-Lin [121],
CROWN [131] and DeepPoly [103]; (c) is used in CROWN
and DeepPoly; (d) shows that CROWN and DeepPoly can
adjust the slope of lower bound.
can search adversarial examples in hidden layers, however, it
fails to verify Lp-bounded robustness. GeoCert [58] enlarges
the certified robust region iteratively by consistently adding
new linear regions overlapping Bp,(x0) and verifying their
robustness. Though it runs slightly slower than MILP-based
approaches, it provides good intermediate verification results
if stopped early.
Summary: More details about complete verification ap-
proaches are discussed in [74]. Current complete verification
approaches cannot scale up to common DNNs even on MNIST
unless the DNN model is specially trained. On the other hand,
these approaches are useful and important when the DNN
models are small such as those for aircraft control system [59].
C. Robustness Verification Based on Linear Relaxation
Due to the scalability barrier of complete robustness ver-
ification, many incomplete verification approaches based on
relaxations are proposed. Among them, linear relaxations are
well studied. This category of verification approaches run much
faster and many can scale up to state-of-the-art models on
CIFAR-10 dataset, which contain 10, 000− 100, 000 neurons.
In general, all linear relaxation-based approaches require
computing li,j and ui,j (see Def. 5) for each neuron zi,j ,
then compute an over-approximation bound S for the region
fθ
(
Bp,(x0)
)
:= {fθ(x) : x ∈ Bp,(x0)}, i.e., S ⊇
fθ
(
Bp,(x0)
)
. S is specially chosen so that it is easy to verify
whether all points in S correspond to the true class y0. If it
is true, the original region fθ
(
Bp,(x0)
)
is robust. Though
these approaches may compute l and u differently, or choose
different S’s, they all describe S by linear constraints.
1) Linear Programming [121, 96, 110]:
In [121], LP-full is proposed, and is further studied in [96].
LP-full is the theoretically tightest verification approach
if only using li,j and ui,j derived from single neuron linear
relaxations.
In LP-full, we compute l and u layer by layer, apply
the polytope relaxation (Def. 5) for each ReLU neuron, and
finally solve the resulting LP problem. Due to the relaxation,
we obtain a lower bound of M(y0, y) in Problem 1.
Even though LPs can be solved in polynomial time, in
practice, solving LP is still expensive. Using LP-full on a typical
model on CIFAR-10 for single instance takes several hours to
several days [96]. Moreover, although LP-full is the tightest
verification approach using single neuron linear relaxations,
comparing with complete verification, the certifiable robust
radius is usually 1.5 − 5 times smaller, which indicates the
intrinsic tightness barrier of linear relaxations.
Recently, C2V [110] is proposed to improve upon LP-full
by leveraging linear relaxations on linear combinations of
neurons instead of single neuron. Its two variants try to
heuristically find good linear combinations for relaxations,
which improve either scalability or tightness, but no better at
order of magnitude.
2) Linear Inequality Propagation [121, 131, 103]:
To circumvent solving LPs, Fast-Lin [121], CROWN [131],
and DeepPoly [103] replace the two lower bounds in tightest
polytope by a single lower bound. The idea is illustrated in
Figs. 2b to 2d. The advantage of single linear lower bound is
that, the linear bounds can be propagated through the layers
efficiently instead of solving LP problem.
Fast-Lin [121] uses a parallel line as the lower bound
as shown in Fig. 2b. CROWN [131] and DeepPoly [103]
both support adjustable lower bound. They use y = λx with
adjustable λ ∈ [0, 1] as the lower bound, while their policies
of determining λ are slightly different.
As an overview, we maintain the linear bound for each
layer k: Lkx + bL,k ≤ zk(x) ≤ Ukx + bU,k for any x ∈
Bp,(x0). From the bound for layer k, we can deduct the
bound after affine mapping zˆk+1 = Wkzk + bk:
(W+k Lk +W
−
k Uk)x+W
+
k bL,k +W
−
k bU,k + bk
≤zˆk+1(x)
≤(W+kUk +W−k Lk)x+W+k bU,k +W−k bL,k + bk.
(6)
Then, we can compute the activation value bound lk+1 and
uk+1 for zˆk+1, and compute the linear bound for zk+1(x) =
ReLU(zˆk+1(x)) using the ReLU polytope relaxation. By
repeating the process, we can finally bound the last layer zˆl,
i.e., the model f itself. Due to computing matrices Lk and Uk,
the time complexity is Θ(ln3i ) if the number of neurons in each
layer is ni. This method scales up to normal models on MNIST
and CIFAR-10, though is still too expensive for ImageNet.
DeepPoly [103] is also based on the linear inequality
propagation described above, though it formally describes the
deduction semantics of the method to provide more flexibility.
3) Zonotopes [45, 78, 101, 1]:
Besides linear inequalities, zonotope is another type of over-
approximation that can be propagated layer by layer efficiently.
AI2 [45], Diffai [78], DeepZ [101], Charon [1], and
RefineZono [104] use zonotopes. Zonotope is a special
form of polytope whose shape can be expressed efficiently.
After affine transformation, the resulting region of zonotope
is still a zonotope which can be easily computed. After
ReLU z 7→ ReLU(zˆ), the resulting region can be over-
approximated by parallelogram (a type of zonotope) as shown
in Fig. 3. Among them, Diffai [78] uses Fig. 3a (zBox) and
Fig. 3b (zDiag) as the base shapes, and heuristically combine
them to form certain shapes of Fig. 3c. DeepZ [101] minimizes
the over-approximation area by selecting appropriate slope of
Fig. 3c. It also supports activation functions other than ReLU.
AI2 [45] also supports zonotope as one type of its abstract
interpretation. To improve tightness, AI2 maintains a set of
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Fig. 3: (a) and (b) are used in [78]; (c) shows that DeepZ [101]
adjusts the slope to minimize the over-approximation area.
zonotopes instead of just one. Charon [1] improves AI2 by
leveraging Bayesian optimization to learn ReLU splitting policy
and the shape of over-approximation for a given input. These
approaches have the same time complexity as linear inequality
propagation, thus similar scalability.
4) Interval Bound Propagation [45, 47]:
A more straightforward and efficient but much looser approach
comes from directly propagating l and u through the layers
of the neural networks. Instead of maintaining linear bounds
or zonotopes as the over-approximation, we directly use the
numerical interval [li, ui], and derive [li+1, ui+1] from [li, ui].
In short, if lk ≤ zk ≤ uk, based on zˆk+1 = Wkzk + bk, zˆk+1
can be bounded by lk+1 ≤ zˆk+1 ≤ uk+1 where
lk+1 = W
+
k lk +W
−
k uk + bk, uk+1 = W
+
k uk +W
−
k lk + bk.
And zk+1 = ReLU(zˆk+1) can be bounded by max{lk+1, 0} ≤
zk+1 ≤ max{uk+1, 0}.
This bound propagation through each layer just performs 4
matrix-vector products, which is at the same order of model
inference. As the result, the approach is scalable for verifying
models on ImageNet. The approach is named interval bound
propagation (IBP) in [47], and is also named interval arithmetic
in the literature. It is equivalent to AI2 with “Box” domain [45].
5) Linear Dual [122, 123, 34, 33]:
Since the robustness verification can be viewed as an optimiza-
tion problem (Problem 1), we can consider the Lagrangian dual.
Especially, since Problem 1 is a minimization problem, any
feasible dual solution provides a valid lower bound of the primal
problem. Moreover, the dual problem is always convex [11].
These characteristics meet the needs for robustness verification.
In WK [122], l and u are computed using an approach the
same as Fast-Lin [121], then the ReLU polytope is used for
over-approximation, which yields an LP problem. WK considers
its dual problem, and by fixing some dual variables, the authors
find that a solution could be derived from layerwise propagation
over a new network, which is called dual network. Thus, once
the dual network is formed, the verification can be done from
its layerwise propagation. According to [96], the fixing of the
selected dual variables results in the ReLU polytope shown in
Fig. 2b which is used by Fast-Lin. Therefore, the tightness
of WK should be close or equivalent to Fast-Lin.
Dvijotham et al. also propose several verification and
training approaches in dual space, such as D-LP [34] and
PVT [33]. Recently, a new dual approach called Lagrangian
decomposition is proposed, which is claimed to be tighter
and faster [16].
6) Hybrid Approaches [102, 104, 134]:
There are several works combining interval bound propagation
and linear inequality propagation (such as [134]), or linear
relaxations and complete verification approaches (such as [118,
117, 104, 102]). The ultimate goal of these works is to achieve
a better trade-off between scalability and tightness by standing
in the midpoint of the combined approaches.
CROWN-IBP [134] combines CROWN [131] and IBP (sec-
tion III-C4). At high level, CROWN-IBP firstly computes l
and u quickly using IBP. Then, it derives the linear bound
from CROWN using l and u. It achieves scalability comparable
to IBP, but improves the tightness of IBP benefited from
CROWN.
RefineZono [104] is extended from zonotope over-
approximation of DeepZ [101]. It uses MILP to refine the l
and u bound. The approach is slower but tighter than DeepZ.
k-ReLU [102] is inspired by DeepPoly [101]. In k-ReLU,
in each layer, they further applying ReLU over-approximations
shown in Fig. 2 to neuron’s linear combinations, e.g.,
∑nk
j=1 zk,j
or −∑nkj=1 zk,j , to tighten the verification. k-ReLU is slower
but moderately tighter than DeepPoly. k-ReLU also shares
some similarities with C2V [110] introduced in Section III-C1.
7) Beyond Feed-Forward ReLU Networks [123, 10]:
In practice, more complex layers or structures such as con-
volutional layers, max-pooling layers, or residual blocks [50]
are commonly used. Many aforementioned approaches also
support them, such as IBP [47], WK+ [123]. CNNCert [10]
extends Fast-Lin and CROWN to support them. Moreover,
many approaches [122, 131, 101, 47] support other activation
functions besides ReLU. Though tighter relaxations for these
activation functions are still open.
8) Robust Training:
The robust training approaches aim to train neural networks
to be certified with non-trivial robustness guarantees. In
this subsection we summarize the major techniques used in
robust training based on or inspired by linear relaxation-based
robustness verification. 3
Certified adversarial training. The robust training ap-
proaches are usually extended from adversarial training [122,
123, 78, 47, 7, 134]. Adversarial training [77] is a powerful [30]
defense which approximately solves the min-max problem:
min
θ
max
x∈Bp,(x0)
l(fθ(x), y0),
where l is the regular loss function such as cross-entropy
loss. The inner maximization is hard to solve due to non-
convexity, and is usually approximated by empirical attacks
such as PGD (projected gradient descent) attack [77]. The outer
minimization optimizes model parameters based on gradients
as normal training. Though adversarially trained models are
robust against existing attacks, it cannot be certified with high
robustness guarantees [111]. In counter to this, many robust
training approaches substitute the inner maximization by the
certified bounds for Problem 1 found by verification approaches.
The certified bounds derived from linear inequalities, relaxed
3 Some work proposes both verification and robust training approach, such
as IBP [47] and CROWN-IBP [134]. In this case, we use the same approach
name to refer to both verification and robust training.
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dual linear problem, and interval bounds are differentiable, so
they can be efficiently optimized by gradient descent during
training. Note that the training only uses training set, but the
non-trivial certified robustness is obtained from the test set,
which indicates that certified adversarial training generalizes,
as first concluded in [122].
Combine adversarial training with regular training loss.
The regular training loss is aimed at improving model accuracy
under normal input (i.e., improving clean accuracy). It can be
combined to the (certified) adversarial training loss to improve
both certified robustness and clean accuracy, which is utilized
by Mixtrain [116], IBP [47], and CROWN-IBP [134].
Penalize over-approximation or unstable neurons. Adding
regularizer to the training objective which encourages tight
verification could help to improve the certified robustness.
Examples are IBP [47], Stability [125], and MMR [26].
MMR-Universal [25] further improves MMR to certifiably
defend against any Lp adversary for p ≥ 1.
Transferability-based training. An intriguing property of
adversarial examples is that, they usually transfer from one
model to another, though these models are trained indepen-
dently [106, 112]. In Robustra [72], a proxy of transferable
adversarial space is used to boost the robustness of robust
training in WK [122].
Summary: Except the linear dual approaches, all other linear
relaxation-based approaches can be viewed as propagating the
over-approximation layer by layer, and the main difference is
based on different types of over-approximation. Future improve-
ments of verification could come from tighter and more efficient
over-approximations (a.k.a. abstract interpretations [45]).
From the optimization point of view, Salman et al. [96]
connect all these linear relaxation based verification approaches
and compare their tightness theoretically: IBP is the loosest.
Fast-Lin [121], DeepZ [101], Diffai [78], and the
dual approach WK [122] have equivalent tightness and time
complexity. CROWN [131] and DeepPoly [104] are tighter
than these with similar time complexity. LP-Full [96]
is the tightest using only single neuron linear relaxations.
Theoretically, k-ReLU [102] can be tighter than LP-Full
given that it uses relaxations based on multiple neurons, if it
leverages LP during computing each l and u. Finally, C2V [110]
is tighter than k-ReLU empirically and theoretically. Generally,
tighter verification approaches are less efficient, as reflected
by the tightness and scalability trade-off.
A pessimistic result is that, even using relatively tight
LP-All, the certified robustness still has large gap compared
with the complete verification. To circumvent this barrier, we
need to turn to hybrid techniques or approaches other than
linear relaxation-based ones.
D. Certified Robustness Based on Semidefinite Programming
Semidefinite programming (SDP) is a convex optimization
problem which can be solved in polynomial time. Its decision
variable is a matrix which is constrained to be symmetric, semi-
positive, and the elements can be linearly constrained [11].
SDP Verify [91] formulates the robustness verification
as a SDP problem. It constrains the outer product matrix of
neuron activations, namely P, to be semi-definite and imposes
ReLU or affine mapping constraints on P. The relaxation
comes from removing the rank constraint of P. SDP Verify
is usually much tighter than linear relaxation-based verification.
Moreover, even for neural networks which are not robustly
trained (e.g., trained via empirical defense), SDP Verify still
provides reasonably good robustness certification. However,
SDP Verify only scales up to small size models on MNIST.
PGD-SDP [35] introduces several additional relaxations
to SDP Verify from the dual space to significantly
improve scalability, though at the expense of tightness.
LMIVerify [42] supports scalability/tightness trade-off ad-
justments via directly analyzing the SDP dual problem, i.e.,
LMI problem. However, in practice, LMI Verify is either
too slow or too loose.
On the training side, SDPTrain [90] is an early-stage robust
training approach which uses SDP relaxation to lower bound
the verification problem (Problem 1). However, the approach is
limited to only two-layer networks, and it achieves non-trivial
certified robustness only on MNIST dataset.
Though SDP-based approaches are tighter than linear relax-
ations, they usually fail to scale up to large models even on
MNIST due to the high time complexity of solving SDP.
E. Certified Robustness Based on Lipschitz and Curvature
If we know f(x0), the lower bound value of f(x) for x ∈
Bp,r(x0) can be easily computed given the local Lipschitz
constant L for x ∈ Bp,r(x0). A few work performs verification
along this line, mainly targeting at providing a tighter estimation
of local Lipschitz constant L.
Op-Norm [106] simply multiples the norm of all weight
matrices Wi to obtain the global Lipschitz constant of
the model. CL [51] computes local Lipschitz constant for
one-hidden-layer neural networks using differentiable proxy
σα(x) = α
−1 log(1 + exp(−αx)) of ReLU as the activation
function, and it proposes a training regularizer to reduce such
Lipschitz constant, i.e., it is also a robust training approach.
FastLip [121] and RecurJac [133] compute local Lips-
chitz constant in a similar way as FastLip and CROWN. SDP
based approaches can also be used for local Lipschitz constant
computation [42], however, the low scalability impedes it from
practical usage. In general, both local and global Lipschitz
constant are too loose to be used in practice.
Recently, CRC/CRT [105] is proposed to leverage the
second-order derivative bound, i.e., curvature bound, for
robustness verification and robust training. The results on
MNIST is promising. However, the approach only supports
smooth activation functions (excluding ReLU), small fully-
connected neural networks on MNIST, and L2 adversary.
F. Probabilistic Robustness Verification
Besides the deterministic verification approaches, one re-
cently emerging branch of studies propose to add random noise
to smooth the models and derive the certified robustness for
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these smoothed models (See Def. 6). We call this line of work
probabilistic robustness verification approaches or randomized-
smoothing based approaches, since they provide probabilistic
robustness guarantees for these randomized models smoothed
by noise.
Definition 6 (Randomized Classifier). Given a smoothing
distribution µ, we use µ(δ) to denote the density at δ. For a
given classifier F , we define the randomized classifier Fsmooth
as:
Fsmooth(x) = arg max
i∈[C]
∫
δ∈supp(µ)
1
[
F (x+ δ) = i
]
µ(δ) dδ.
In probabilistic verification, the integral in Def. 6 cannot
be exactly solved. Thus, instead, Monte Carlo estimation and
hypothesis test from [53] are used to approximate the exact
solution. As a result, the verification result only holds with
certain probability as mentioned in Def. 3. Specifically, most
of existing work follows the approximation algorithm CERTIFY
in [24].
To our best knowledge, all existing probabilistic verification
approaches keep agnosticism about model architectures. This
relaxation makes probabilistic approaches scalable to large
neural network models such as those on ImageNet dataset.
However, due to the relaxations, all the probabilistic verification
approaches are incomplete. Among the existing methodologies,
the Neyman-Pearson based approaches (Section III-F2) achieve
the tightest certification under the probabilistic setting.
1) Motivation from Differential Privacy [65, 71]:
Differential privacy [37] aims at securing sensitive information
while releasing statistical quantities from a database. The core
idea is — if the absence of an individual would nearly not
influence the statistics, no privacy of this individual could be
leaked by comparing the difference of statistics. Analogously,
if the change or absence of a few pixels cannot be concluded
by comparing the difference of statistics (e.g., the model
prediction), the model itself should be robust. Based on this
connection, [65] first proves the effectiveness of the randomized
smoothing technique as a defense mechanism and provides
rigorous robustness verification under probabilistic setting.
Gaussian and Laplacian mechanisms from [37] are directly
adopted for randomization and robustness verification.
Later, the robustness radius (recall the definition in Sec-
tion II-A) derived in [65] are shown to be loose. Li et al. [71]
derive tighter robustness radius by bounding the variation of
the output based on Re´nyi Divergence. Specifically, with the
smoothing distribution as Gaussian N (0, σ2I), the L2 certified
robustness radius r is derived as:
r = supα>1−
2σ2
α
log
(
1− PA − PB + 2
(
1
2 (P
1−α
A + P
1−α
B )
) 1
1−α
)
,
where PA, PB are the probabilities of top-1 and runner-up
classes respectively, α is the parameter of Re´nyi Divergence.
Similarly, r = −λ log(1−PA +PB) is derived for L1 metric
under Laplacian noise Laplace(0, λ).
2) Neyman-Pearson Based approaches [24, 108, 66, 68,
130]:
Geometry perspective. Suppose we choose uniform distri-
bution on a bounded ball Bp, as the smoothing distribution.
For any input x0, the randomized classifier queries all points
in Bp,(x0) uniformly and picks the label c which has the
largest mass PA. Likewise, for its neighboring point x′0, the
randomized classifier queries all points in Bp,(x′0) uniformly.
To lower bound the mass of label c in Bp,(x′0), namely P
′
A,
the information we can use is the volume of intersection
Bp,(x0) ∩Bp,(x′0) which is represented by β. Then, we can
lower bound P ′A as P
′
A ≥ max{PA−(1−β), 0} by considering
the worst case that all the points in the non-intersection region
have the label c. If the lower bound of P ′A ≥ 0.5, we can
certify that the predicted label at point x′0 is still c. Unlike the
uniform distribution, if we choose other noise distributions such
as Gaussian or Laplace, which has non-zero support for the
whole data space, lower bounding P ′A involves more analysis.
Intuitively, the concepts of “intersection” and “non-intersection”
can be generalized to “likelihood ratio”.
Definition 7 (Likelihood Ratio). The likelihood ratio on z
under two sampling centers x and x¯ is defined as follow:
ηx,x¯(z) :=
µ(z − x)
µ(z − x¯) .
Given Def. 7, one intuition is: the region where the likelihood
ratio is very close to 1 could be deemed as the general form of
intersection region, and otherwise the non-intersection region.
Analogously, given the mass PA of label c under shifted
distribution x+µ (meaning distribution µ shifted by vector x),
we could try to find the lower bound of the mass P ′A for label
c under shifted distribution x′ + µ by greedily supposing all
the points with high likelihood ratio have label c (similar to
supposing all points in “non-intersection” region have label c).
To be more concrete, we need to find a threshold k, such that the
set (called Neyman-Pearson set later) S = {z : ηx0,x′0(z) ≥ k}
exactly has a mass of PA under the distribution x0 + µ, then
the mass of S under distribution x′0 + µ is the tightest lower
bound we can achieve for P ′A without additional information
other than label statistics. This intuition is theoretically justified
in [24] by applying the Neyman-Pearson lemma [82].
Optimization perspective. Despite additional uncertainty in
randomized classifiers, the verification could still be modeled
as an optimization problem similar to the discussion in
Problem 1. Zhang et al. [130] proposed a verification framework
purely from optimization perspective.
Since we keep agnosticism about the base classifier F and
the only knowledge we have is Prδ∼µ[F (x + δ) = c] = PA,
the key idea of [130] is to compute the lower bound of
minx′:‖x−x′‖p≤r Prδ∼µ[F (x
′ + δ) = c] by performing relax-
ation on the base classifier F . More concretely, they allow F
to be any function from H := {H : H(z) ∈ [C],∀z ∈ Rn},
as long as the condition Prδ∼µ[F (x + δ) = c] = PA holds.
Through Lagrange duality, this relaxed optimization problem
could be efficiently solved using the proposed algorithm.
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Essentially, this methodology is still based on Neyman-Pearson,
since a Neyman-Pearson set is implicitly constructed during
the optimization process.
We observe that a considerable amount of probabilistic veri-
fication approaches [24, 66, 108, 130, 68] could be attributed
to this family, and they either explicitly or implicitly construct
the Neyman-Pearson set S. We outline these approaches as
follow.
Verification under L2 metric. Under Gaussian smoothing
distribution µ, given Prδ∼µ[F (x + δ) = c] = p, Cohen
et al. [24] construct the corresponding Neyman-Pearson set for
L2 metric:
S :=
{
z ∈ Rd : vT(z − x) ≥ σ‖v‖2Φ−1(p)
}
,
and the L2 robustness radius is derived as: r =
σ
2
(
Φ−1(PA)− Φ−1(PB)
)
, where σ is the standard deviation
of Gaussian noise and Φ is the standard Gaussian CDF.
Verification under L1 metric. Similarly, Teng et al. [108]
derive the closed form for L1 robust radius under Laplacian
noise: R = max
{
λ
2 log(PA/PB), −λ log(1− PA + PB)
}
.
[108] is very similar to [71] in that they both derive the term
−λ log(1− PA + PB), although from different perspectives.
Verification under L0 metric. Lee et al. [66] consider the
discrete setting, where the smoothing distribution is on discrete
space (values of pixels are randomly sampled from a small
discrete set) and the distance metric is L0. They propose to
partition the data space X into n regions {Xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
such that ∪˙ni=1Xi = X , and the likelihood ratio within each
region Xi is a constant ηi ∈ [0,∞]. Based on this partition, the
Neyman-Pearson set could be constructed, and the certification
could be effectively computed.
Recently, Levine and Feizi [68] also propose to certify L0
robustness. They adopt a different smoothing technique —
randomized ablation, where the randomly smoothed input x′ is
generated by randomly ablating pixels from the original input
x. Empirically, the randomized ablation strategy suits the L0
metric well and achieves better certified robustness.
3) General Verification Frameworks for Various Settings:
Dvijotham et al. [36] and Yang et al. [128] attempt to devise
more general verification frameworks that could be easily
extended to various distance norms.
Dvijotham et al. [36] propose to compute the
lower bound of the non-convex optimization problem
minx′:ρ(x,x′)≤r Prδ∼µ[F (x′ + µ) = c] by relaxing the norm
bound of perturbation to a divergence bound. The high level
idea is: with ρ(x′, x) ≤ r, there should be a bound η for the
distribution divergence as D
(
(x+ µ)‖(x′ + µ)) ≤ η, where
D denotes certain divergence. Thus, the relaxation is derived
as: minU ′:D(U ′‖(x+µ))≤η PrX∼U ′ [f(X) = c]. However, in real
implementation, the certified robustness radius computed via
this framework is usually too loose comparing with other
approaches. Similar result is also reported by [128].
Yang et al. [128] propose a pair of complementary verifica-
tion approaches — level set method and differential method.
The former one is generalized from the Neyman-Pearson
based approaches and offers favorable certification results for
spherical noise. The latter offers support for non-spherical noise,
and is based on a worst-case path integral R :=
∫ 1/2
1−PA dt/Ψ(t),
where PA is the probability of the top class and Ψ(p) :=
sup‖v‖=1 supU⊆Rd:q(U)=p limr→0
(
q(U − rv)− p) /r. By ap-
plying the differential method, the authors have derived the
closed form of certified robustness under different settings.
4) Robust Training for Randomized Models [24, 65, 95,
19, 71, 54, 129, 43, 5, 130, 128]:
This subsection mainly summarizes robust training approaches
for randomized models, along with other efforts towards robust
randomized models.
Data augmentation. Empirically, [24] and [65] suggest that
we could augment the training data with the noised corrupted
ones. This augmentation technique works well in practice and
is also formally justified by [24]. Currently, this is still the
most widely-used training approach under probabilistic setting.
Besides leveraging the noise corrupted data, several work also
utilize additional unlabeled data to pretrain the models to
enhance the robustness [95, 19].
Regularization. Robust training of randomized models can be
achieved by regularizing the models to be stable or consistent
under noise perturbations. For example, Li et al. [71] train
randomized models by adding a regularization term into the
training objective which minimizes the cross-entropy loss of
models outputs between original samples and noise samples.
Jeong and Shin [54] further improve it by only minimizing
the cross-entropy loss among noised samples. MACER [129]
derives a regularization term which directly maximizes the
certified robustness. ADRE [43] proposes another regularizer
to penalize the misclassified samples and improve the certified
robustness of the correctly predicted samples.
Adversarial training. Adversarial training framework is
widely used in empirical defenses and deterministic verification
based defenses. Salman et al. [95] propose to combine
adversarial training with the probabilistic verification frame-
work. This combination exhibits a promising complementary
property: adversarial training boosts the certified robustness
of randomized models by a significant margin. Low Rank
enforcement [5] further improves [95] by projecting the
noised data to low-dimension space then applying adversarial
training.
Choice of smoothing distribution. Besides the training
approaches, the choice of smoothing distribution is also an
important factor that affects the certified robustness.
Most existing approaches adopt Gaussian noise and Lapla-
cian noise as the default choices for L2 and L1 distance metrics
respectively. However, Zhang et al. [130] point out that in high
dimensional space, under Gaussian and Laplacian distributions,
most mass concentrates on a thin shell far from the center.
They argue that this decentralization makes these two noises
sub-optimal and propose several substitutes.
Yang et al. [128] also studied the optimal choice of
smoothing distribution. They show that against Lp adversary
the optimal smoothing distributions have level sets that are
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TABLE I: Deterministic verification approaches benchmarked
in our evaluation.
Category Approach Implementation
MILP Bounded MILP [111] Reimplementation
Branch and Bound AI2 [45] From [103]
LP-Full [121, 96] From [10]
DeepPoly [103] From [103]
Fast-Lin [121] From [10]
Linear CROWN [131] From [134]
Relaxation CNN-Cert [10] From [10]
CROWN-IBP [134] From [134]
IBP [47] Reimplementation
WK [122, 123] From [123]
Hybrid k-ReLU [102] From [103]
RefineZono [102] From [103]
SDP SDPVerify [91] Reimplementation
LMIVerify [41] Reimplementation
Lipschitz
Op-norm [106] From [133]
Fast-Lip [121] From [133]
RecurJac [133] From [133]
their respective Wulff Crystals — a kind of crystal structure
studied in physics. Specifically, uniform noise is shown to be
much better than Laplacian noise against L1 adversary.
IV. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
We evaluate and compare the robustness verification and
training approaches by two sets of experiments: (1) for major
deterministic verification approaches, we compare their certified
robustness over a diverse set of trained models of different
scales; (2) for major probabilistic verification approaches and
their corresponding robust training approaches, we compare
the best certified robustness they jointly achieve since the
verification and training approaches are usually coupled. We
do such separation mainly because in deterministic and
probabilistic settings, the model inference methods are different
and cannot be directly compared.
We provide the first open-sourced unified evaluation platform
— a toolkit integrating a wide range of verification approaches
by succinct and uniform interface based on PyTorch [85] (see
Section I for URL). In the toolkit, we tend to integrate the
original implementations released by the authors when it is
available; otherwise, we implement and optimize them to match
the reported performance.
Experiment Environment. We run the evaluation on 24-core
Intel Xeon Platinum 8259CL CPU running at 2.50 GHz with
single NVIDIA Tesla T4 GPU.
A. Comparison of Deterministic Verification Approaches
We present a thorough comparison of major deterministic
verification approaches as listed in Table I.
1) Experimental Setup:
Dataset. We evaluate these verification approaches on
image classification datasets MNIST [65] and CIFAR-10 [62].
We deter the experiment settings and results on MNIST to
Appendix C.
Models. We include 7 different neural network structures
from the literature. Among them, 3 (FCNNA - FCNNC) are
fully-connected neural networks, and 4 (CNNA - CNND)
are convolutional neural networks. They are all feed-forward
ReLU neural networks. The number of neurons ranges from
50 (FCNNA) to about 200, 000 (CNND). For each neural
network structure, we train 5 sets of weights:
• clean: regular training;
• adv2: PGD adversarial training with  = 2/255;
• adv8: PGD adversarial training with  = 8/255;
• cadv2: CROWN-IBP training with  = 2/255;
• cadv8: CROWN-IBP training with  = 8/255.
Here,  is the L∞ radius of the adversarial examples. The
PGD adversarial training [77] is a strong empirical defense.
The CROWN-IBP [134] is a strong robust training approach,
which achieves state-of-the-art certified robustness on CIFAR-
10 against (L∞, 8/255) adversary. We choose these training
configurations to reflect 3 common types of models on which
verification approaches are used: normal models; empirical
defense models; and robustly trained models. All models are
trained to reach their expected accuracy or robustness. We
defer the model structure and statistics to Appendix C.
Evaluation protocol. We present the performance of verifi-
cation approaches by their robust accuracy with respect to L∞
radius . The chosen radius  for verification corresponds to the
radius trained for defense. The robust accuracy is defined as
robacc :=
# samples verified to be robust
# number of all samples
. On each dataset,
we uniformly sample 100 test set samples as the fixed set
for evaluation. We further limit the running time to 60 s per
instance and count timeout instances as “non-robust”.
We also report the robust accuracy under empirical at-
tack (PGD attack), which gives an upper bound of robust
accuracy, so we can estimate the gap between certified robust
accuracy and accuracy of existing attack.
For verification approaches with hyperparameters, we use
their default hyperparameters as described in the papers or
original implementations. We remark that due to hyperparam-
eter tuning, limited running time (60 s), and different neural
network models used in evaluation, the robust accuracy of some
approaches differs much with the reported numbers, such as
k-ReLU [102], RefineZono [104], SDPVerify [91], and
LMIVerify [41]. We also evaluate the verification approaches
by measuring their average certified robustness radius. The
results are in Appendix C.
2) Results and Discussions:
Table II shows robust accuracy on CIFAR-10 dataset. Each
row corresponds to a verification approach, PGD attack, or
clean accuracy. Each column corresponds to a DNN model.
Appendix C contains full experiment results and additional
findings.
Remarks. (1) On relatively small models, complete verifi-
cation approaches can effectively compute the exact robust
accuracy, thus they are the best choice. (2) On larger models,
if the model is normally trained or heuristically defensed,
usually linear inequality propagation or zonotope based
verification approaches (including DeepPoly, Fast-Lin,
CROWN, CNN-Cert, CROWN-IBP, WK) are the best. Since
the complete verification approaches are too slow and other
approaches are too loose. However, they cannot handle large
DNNs and they are still too loose comparing with the PGD
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TABLE II: Robust accuracy on CIFAR-10 models certified by different deterministic verification approaches. The verification
is under L∞ adversary with radius  (specified in table). We include accuracy under PGD attack to serve as the upper bound of
robust accuracy, and the clean accuracy. The bolded numbers mark the highest ones among verification approaches.
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
 = 0.5/255 clean clean clean clean clean clean clean
Bounded MILP 40% 43% 0% 23% 0% 0% 0%
AI2 40% 43% 0% 51% 9% 0% 0%
LP-Full 40% 43% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DeepPoly 40% 43% 0% 51% 52% 0% 0%
Fast-Lin 40% 42% 49% 51% 49% 45% 0%
CROWN 40% 43% 51% 51% 52% 0% 0%
CNN-Cert 40% 43% 0% 51% 52% 0% 0%
CROWN-IBP 40% 24% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0%
IBP 29% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WK 40% 42% 49% 51% 49% 45% 3%
k-ReLU 40% 43% 0% 48% 0% 0% 0%
RefineZono 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SDPVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LMIVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Op-norm 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FastLip 40% 40% 0% 36% 0% 0% 0%
RecurJac 40% 42% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PGD Upper Bound 40% 43% 53% 51% 61% 49% 76%
Clean Acc. 41% 47% 54% 57% 68% 54% 85%
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
 = 2/255 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2
Bounded MILP 35% 33% 30% 37% 0% 0% 0% 47% 0% 49% 0% 0% 0% 0%
AI2 35% 33% 39% 37% 0% 20% 34% 47% 19% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LP-Full 35% 33% 36% 37% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DeepPoly 35% 33% 36% 35% 0% 17% 34% 46% 19% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fast-Lin 35% 33% 35% 34% 0% 30% 33% 45% 14% 43% 13% 46% 0% 0%
CROWN 35% 33% 36% 35% 1% 32% 34% 46% 19% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CNN-Cert 35% 33% 35% 35% 0% 0% 34% 46% 19% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CROWN-IBP 30% 33% 0% 34% 0% 32% 0% 46% 0% 46% 0% 50% 0% 47%
IBP 6% 33% 0% 35% 0% 32% 0% 45% 0% 49% 0% 51% 0% 51%
WK 35% 33% 35% 34% 0% 30% 33% 45% 14% 43% 13% 46% 0% 23%
k-ReLU 35% 33% 35% 37% 0% 0% 0% 44% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
RefineZono 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SDPVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LMIVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Op-norm 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FastLip 33% 32% 15% 32% 0% 25% 3% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
RecurJac 34% 32% 33% 32% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PGD Upper Bound 36% 35% 41% 39% 26% 38% 43% 49% 52% 50% 49% 53% 62% 54%
Clean Acc. 44% 40% 48% 43% 35% 46% 54% 55% 66% 60% 59% 63% 81% 62%
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
 = 8/255 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8
Bounded MILP 19% 27% 1% 25% 0% 0% 0% 34% 0% 36% 0% 0% 0% 0%
AI2 19% 27% 7% 23% 0% 22% 8% 34% 0% 20% 0% 14% 0% 0%
LP-Full 15% 27% 6% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DeepPoly 15% 27% 6% 20% 0% 22% 8% 33% 1% 20% 0% 7% 0% 0%
Fast-Lin 15% 25% 4% 18% 0% 19% 3% 26% 0% 15% 0% 7% 0% 0%
CROWN 15% 27% 6% 20% 0% 22% 8% 33% 1% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CNN-Cert 15% 27% 5% 20% 0% 0% 7% 33% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CROWN-IBP 9% 27% 0% 22% 0% 28% 0% 34% 0% 31% 0% 32% 0% 25%
IBP 0% 27% 0% 25% 0% 30% 0% 34% 0% 35% 0% 38% 0% 28%
WK 15% 25% 4% 18% 0% 19% 3% 26% 0% 15% 0% 7% 0% 5%
k-ReLU 15% 27% 2% 23% 0% 0% 0% 32% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
RefineZono 0% 27% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SDPVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LMIVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Op-norm 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FastLip 12% 27% 0% 17% 0% 17% 0% 24% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
RecurJac 14% 27% 2% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PGD Upper Bound 22% 28% 23% 26% 19% 34% 34% 34% 33% 39% 36% 40% 41% 31%
Clean Acc. 33% 31% 37% 30% 26% 39% 44% 46% 53% 48% 52% 46% 66% 46%
11
TABLE III: Probabilistic approaches used in evaluation.
Approaches Adversaries in Evaluation
Verification Differential Privacy Based [65] L1,L2
Approaches Neyman-Pearson Based [24, 128, 130, 108] L1,L2,L∞
f -Divergence [36] L2
Re´nyi divergence Based [71] L1
Robust Training Data Augmentation [24, 128] L1,L2,L∞
Approaches Adversarial Training [95] L2
Adversarial + Pretraining [95, 19] L2
MACER [129] L2
ADRE [43] L2
upper bound of robust accuracy. (3) On robustly trained models,
if the robust training approach is CROWN-IBP, the verification
approach IBP and CROWN-IBP perform the best. Both of them
can scale up to large DNNs and the gap with PGD upper bound
is small. Similar observations can be found on MNIST and
consistent with the literature [122, 134]. (4) Hybrid approaches,
SDP-based approaches, and Lipschitz-based approaches are
typically inferior than linear relaxation-based approaches and
complete verification approaches under most settings.
B. Comparison of Probabilistic Approaches
We present a through comparison of major probabilistic
approaches including both verification approaches (include dif-
ferent smoothing distributions) and robust training approaches.
1) Experimental Setup:
We implement various major verification approaches and
integrate representative robust training approaches. In our
evaluation, we either fix the robust training part and vary
the verification approaches, or the other way around.
Dataset. Our evaluation is on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet [94].
Models. Following common practice in literature [24, 128],
we use ResNet-110 and Wide ResNet 40-2 on CIFAR-10; and
ResNet-50 on ImageNet.
Number of Samples and failure probability. Following
common practice, on both datasets, n = 1, 000 samples are
used for selecting the top label; N = 100, 000 samples are used
for certification. The failure probability is set to 1− α = .001.
Evaluation Protocol. For both datasets, we evaluate on a
subset of 500 samples uniformly drawn from the test set.
We report and compare the robust accuracy (see definition
in Section IV-A) at given radius r under Lp for p = 1, 2, ∞.
Evaluated approaches. We list the evaluated approaches
in Table III. We tune the hyper-parameters to achieve the
best performance for each approach. To evaluate the L∞
robustness, we use the following norm conversion rule: given
input dimension d, since ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖x‖∞
√
d, the model with
certified robust radius r in L2 norm at point x0 is also
certified robust with radius r/
√
d in L∞ norm. The above
conversion gives L∞ robustness certification from existing L2-
based certification, which is empirically shown to achieve the
highest certified robustness for probabilistic approaches under
L∞ adversary.
2) Results and Discussions:
Table IV shows the results. Each “Group #” labels a variable-
controlled comparable group.
Remarks. (1) For both L1 and L2 adversaries, Neyman-
Pearson based verification achieves the tightest results com-
pared to other verification approaches. (2) The robust train-
ing approaches effectively enhances the models’ certified
robustness. Among these existing robust training approaches,
adversarial training usually achieves the best performance.
(3) The choice of smoothing distribution can greatly affect
the robustness of randomized models. One evidence is that,
under L1 adversary, the superior result is achieved by uniform
smoothing distribution. (4) For probabilistic verification ap-
proaches, certifying robustness under L∞ adversary is hard,
and would become harder when the data dimension increases.
V. RELATED APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The methodologies derived from neural network certified
robustness have recently been applied to much boarder areas.
In this section we exemplify the representatives.
Beyond Lp adversary. There are several beyond Lp adver-
sarial attacks proposed recently. The semantic transformations
such as rotation or scaling with small angles or ratios can gen-
erate adversarial examples [39, 126]. Linear-relaxation based
approaches [103, 8, 81] or probabilistic approaches [44, 73] can
provide robustness verification against these attacks. Moreover,
if the input image space is discrete, the robustness verification
against these attacks can be achieved by enumeration [86].
The patch adversary will add a small patch to the input
image with random pattern. Robustness verification against
patch adversary is subsumed by verification against L0 adver-
sary [66, 68]. There are also other better-tailored verification
approaches [22, 67] based on linear relaxations or probabilistic
approaches. Levine and Feizi [69] propose verification against
Wasserstein adversary [124]. A few verification approaches can
verify predefined linear safety properties. These approaches can
be either complete [38, 60, 52] or incomplete [89]. Recently,
probabilistic verification approaches are extended to verify
top-k prediction robustness [55], and robustness against label-
flipping attack [93] and back-door attack [120, 70].
Beyond classical neural network models. The methodolo-
gies derived from DNN robustness verification have inspired
robustness verification approaches for: tree models [20, 3];
model ensemble [132], probabilistic models [32], and gener-
ative models [79]. We note that the certified robustness on
boosted trees is comparable to DNNs on MNIST and CIFAR-
10 [3].
Beyond image based classification. In natural language
processing, the linear relaxations have been adopted to certify
robustness against word substitutions [57], word transforma-
tions [135], and robustness of transformers with self-attention
and cross-position dependency [98]. In graph neural networks,
recent robustness verification approaches are motivated from
either linear relaxations [9, 136] or randomized smoothing [56].
The relaxation-based approaches can also verify the reinforce-
ment learning robustness [119, 76].
VI. DISCUSSION
Where are we? After the booming in recent years, the
certified robustness on DNNs have had significant progresses
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TABLE IV: Robust accuracy on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet models of probabilistic approaches. The models are trained with various
robust training approaches and built using smoothing distributions labelled as “Smooth Dist.”. Each group is variable-controlled.
The bolded numbers mark the highest ones within the group.
Group # Adversary Dataset Model Structure Verification Robust Training Smooth Dist. Certified Robust Accuracy under Radius r
r = 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50
I
L2 CIFAR-10
Wide ResNet 40-2
Differential Privacy
Data Augmentation
Gaussian
34.2% 14.8% 6.8% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Neyman-Pearson 68.8% 46.8% 36.0% 25.4% 19.8% 15.6%
f -Divergence 62.2% 41.8% 27.2% 19.2% 14.2% 11.4%
II ResNet-110 Neyman-Pearson
Data Augmentation 61.2% 43.2% 32.0% 22.4% 17.2% 14.0%
Adversarial Training 73.0% 57.8% 48.2% 37.2% 33.6% 28.2%
Adversarial + Pretraining 81.8% 62.6% 52.4% 37.2% 34.0% 30.2%
MACER 68.8% 52.6% 40.4% 33.0% 27.8% 25.0%
ADRE 68.0% 50.2% 37.8% 30.2% 23.0% 17.0%
r = 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
III
L2 ImageNet ResNet-50
Differential Privacy
Data Augmentation
Gaussian
26.0% 12.2% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Neyman-Pearson 49.2% 37.4% 29.0% 19.2% 14.8% 12.0%
f -Divergence 43.4% 30.4% 13.6% 3.2% 0.0% 0.0%
IV Neyman-Pearson
Data Augmentation 49.2% 37.4% 29.0% 19.2% 14.8% 12.0%
Adversarial Training 56.4% 44.8% 38.2% 28.0% 25.6% 20.0%
MACER 57.0% 43.2% 31.4% 24.8% 17.6% 14.0%
ADRE 57.0% 41.8% 30.0% 23.6% 17.8% 14.2%
r = 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 4.0
V
L1
CIFAR-10 Wide ResNet 40-2
Differential Privacy
Data Augmentation
Laplace
43.0% 20.8% 12.2% 7.2% 1.4% 0.0%
Re´nyi Divergence 58.2% 39.4% 27.0% 16.8% 9.2% 4.0%
Neyman-Pearson 58.4% 39.6% 27.0% 17.2% 9.2% 4.2%Uniform 69.2% 56.6% 48.0% 39.4% 26.0% 20.4%
VI ImageNet ResNet-50
Differential Privacy
Laplace
39.0% 26.2% 17.8% 13.0% 6.8% 0.0%
Re´nyi Divergence 48.2% 40.4% 31.0% 25.8% 19.0% 13.6%
Neyman-Pearson 49.0% 40.8% 31.2% 26.0% 19.0% 13.6%Uniform 55.2% 49.0% 45.6% 42.0% 32.8% 24.8%
r = 1/255 2/255 4/255 8/255
VII
L∞
CIFAR-10 Wide ResNet 40-2
Neyman-Pearson
Data Augmentation
Gaussian
71.4% 52.0% 29.0% 12.8%
Adversarial Training 83.2% 65.0% 49.6% 25.4%
VIII ImageNet ResNet-50 Data Augmentation 28.2% 11.4% 0.0% 0.0%Adversarial Training 38.2% 20.4% 4.6% 0.0%
in practice. On MNIST, the certified robust accuracy against
L∞ adversary with 0.3 radius has reached over 92%; with 0.4
radius has reached about 88% [47, 134]. This is remarkable
since the limit is 0.5 radius where any input image can be
perturbed to indistinguishable half-gray. This is achieved by
CROWN-IBP and IBP robust training, which is derived from
the time efficient but loose verification approach. On more
challenging CIFAR-10 and ImageNet dataset, however, current
certified robust accuracy is still vacuous. On CIFAR-10, against
L∞ adversary with 2/255 radius, it is only about 68% certified
robust accuracy [95]; with 8/255 radius, it is only about
33% certified robust accuracy [134]. Both numbers are too
far from the over 90% accuracy on clean inputs achieved
by common CIFAR-10 models. On ImageNet, currently, only
probabilistic approaches, e.g., [24, 128, 95], can provide non-
trivial robustness bound: 28% under L2 radius 2.0; and about
38% under L∞ radius 1/255 [134]. They are achieved by
pre-training, self-training, then adversarial training of the
randomized models. The Neyman-Pearson based approach
provides the robustness certification for such trained model.
As we can see, deterministic approaches perform well
on small dataset like MNIST. On slightly larger CIFAR-10,
deterministic approaches are better with large radius while
probabilistic approaches are better with small radius. On large
dataset ImageNet, the probabilistic approaches outperforms
deterministic ones significantly.
Challenges. From above results, one may think about
improving probabilistic approaches to achieve better certified
robustness on large datasets. However, current probabilistic
approaches suffer from great challenges both theoretically and
practically. Theoretically, they suffer from curse of dimen-
sionality: without more information than label statistics, no
smoothing techniques can certify non-trivial robust accuracy
at L∞ radius Ω
(
min(1, d
1
p− 12 )
)
[128, 63]. This conclusion
implies that current probabilistic approaches cannot certify
large L∞ radius intrinsically. Empirically, to certify large radius
using probabilistic approach, we have to exert large noise to
the input, which significantly hurt the prediction accuracy [24].
Now we present a novel barrier for randomized classifiers.
Theorem 1. For binary classification task, for any Lp norm,
assume the base classifier F ’s decision region for label y0
is centered at x0 with radius r, i.e., F (x) = y0 ⇐⇒
x ∈ Bp,r(x0). Define the randomized classifier Gµ(x) :=
arg maxi Eδ∼µ
[
F (x+ δ) = i
]
where δ is drawn from any
continuous distribution µ. Its robust radius at point x0 satisfies
r′ < r, i.e., there exists x such that ‖x − x0‖p ≤ r and
Gµ(x) 6= y0.
The proof is deferred to Appendix A. Intuitively, the theorem
implies that, if a base classifier F ’s decision region for some
label y0 is exactly the ball Bp,r(x0), then, after smoothing by
any continuous distribution µ, the resulting decision region
for y0 in the randomized classifier Gµ does not contain any
r-radius ball under Lp metric. It implies that when the base
classifier is robust within an Lp ball, then any randomized
classifier cannot enlarge the robust ball’s radius anymore for
any Lp metric. Such decision region shrinkage is also utilized
for a theoretical explanation of trade-off between accuracy and
certified robustness in Gaussian-smoothing based probabilistic
verification approaches under L2 adversary [80]. Before [80],
such trade-off is widely observed [40, 114, 92] and just
intuitively explained for probabilistic verification [128, 130].
On the other hand, the deterministic verification approaches
suffer from strong trade-off between tightness and scalability.
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Comparing to probabilistic approaches, since they require
complex computation within the model, they usually have
much poorer scalability and can hardly support typically large
models on ImageNet. Though further improvements for linear
relaxations and SDP approaches should be possible, the NP-
completeness barrier blocks substantial advance or rigorous
tightness/efficiency guarantee. For deterministic verification-
based robust training, the trade-off between accuracy and
certified robustness is also observed [116, 122].
Future Directions. We believe major improvements of
certified robustness could come from the following aspects:
(1) Tighter and more efficient verification: just as MILP-based
approaches have satisfactory efficiency for verifying robustly
trained models even given its worst-case exponential complex-
ity, it is quite possible to improve other verification approaches
to perform well in practice. In fact, Baader et al. [6] prove
the universal approximation power of IBP-certifiable neu-
ral networks. (2) More effective robust training approaches:
though the trade-off between accuracy and certified robustness
exists, it does not filter out further improvements from
either accuracy or certified robustness. Actually, more ef-
fective robust training approaches are proposed consistently.
(3) Better inference scheme: jumping out of using DNNs,
we have seen that boosted trees have comparable certified
robustness on MNIST and CIFAR-10. One future direction
could be leveraging more structured machine learning models
to improve the certified robustness, in which DNNs could serve
as a component.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present the systematization of knowledge
for certifiably robust approaches for DNNs, including both
robustness verification approaches and corresponding robust
training approaches. The comprehensive study shows that, there
have been a remarkable research progress in certified robustness
for DNNs, both practically and theoretically. Our discussion
reveals current research status, limitations, and future directions
in this emerging and promising field.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We define g(x)y0 := Eδ∼µ
[
F (x+ δ) = y0
]
. From the
condition,
g(x)y0 =
∫
1
[
f(x+ δ) = y0
]
µ(δ) dδ
=
∫
‖z−(x0−x)‖p≤r
µ(z) dz,
where µ(z) is the PDF of distribution µ at point z. Suppose
the proposition is false, we have g(x0 + re1)y0 > 0.5 and
g(x0 − re1)y0 > 0.5, where e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T for p <∞ or
e1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)
T for p =∞. Thus,∫
‖z−re1‖p≤r
µ(z) dz +
∫
‖z+re1‖p≤r
µ(z) dz > 1.
Note that {z : ‖z−re1‖p ≤ r}∩{z : ‖z+re1‖p ≤ r} = {0}
has zero mass, it means that µ has probability mass > 1 in
region {z : ‖z − re1‖p ≤ r} ∪ {z : ‖z + re1‖p ≤ r}, which
contradicts the definition of probability measure.
B. Full Taxonomy Table
The full taxonomy table is shown in Table V.
C. Full Experiment Details of Evaluation of Deterministic
Verification Approaches
In this appendix, we provide some more details about
the evaluation of deterministic verification approaches (Sec-
tion IV-A).
1) Experimental Setup:
Experiment Environment. For MNIST experiments, we
run the evaluation on 24-core Intel Xeon E5-2650 CPU running
at 2.20 GHz with single NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
For CIFAR-10 experiments, we run the evaluation on 24-core
Intel Xeon Platinum 8259CL CPU running at 2.50 GHz with
single NVIDIA Tesla T4 GPU. The CIFAR-10 experiments
use slightly faster running environment due to its larger scale.
Tool Implementation. We implement our tool mainly in
PyTorch [85]. Some verification approaches use keras [61]
and Tensorflow [109]. For them, we implement a model
translator from PyTorch directly to keras model, or to
onnx [83] intermediate representation. The verification ap-
proaches reimplemented by ourselves use intrinsic PyTorch
tensor computations, or CVXPY [27] + Gurobi [49] solver
when there is an optimization problem to solve. We test our
implementation to ensure the correctness and high-efficiency.
For verification approaches with hyperparameters, we use
the hyperparameters used in their papers or their original
implementations.
Models. We include 7 different neural network structures from
the literature and adapt them for each dataset. Among them,
3 (FCNNA - FCNNC) are fully-connected neural networks, and
4 (CNNA - CNND) are convolutional neural networks. They
are all feed-forward ReLU neural networks. The number of
neurons ranges from 50 (FCNNA) to about 200, 000 (CNND).
For each neural network structure, we train 5 sets of weights:
• clean (on both MNIST and CIFAR-10): regular training;
• adv1 (on MNIST)/adv2 (on CIFAR-10):
PGD adversarial training with  = 0.1 (on MNIST) or
 = 2/255 (on CIFAR-10);
• adv3 (on MNIST)/adv8 (on CIFAR-10):
PGD adversarial training with  = 0.3 (on MNIST) or
 = 8/255 (on CIFAR-10);
• cadv1 (on MNIST)/cadv2 (on CIFAR-10):
CROWN-IBP training with  = 0.1 (on MNIST) or  =
2/255 (on CIFAR-10);
• cadv3 (on MNIST)/cadv8 (on CIFAR-10):
CROWN-IBP training with  = 0.3 (on MNIST) or  =
8/255 (on CIFAR-10).
Here,  is the L∞ radius of the adversarial examples. The
PGD adversarial training [77] is a strong empirical defense.
We use 40-step PGD in the PGD adversarial training. The
CROWN-IBP [134] is a strong robust training approach. It
achieves state-of-the-art certified robustness under (L∞, 8/255)
adversary. We choose these training configurations to reflect 3
common types of models on which verification approaches are
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TABLE V: Taxonomy of neural network robustness verification and robust training approaches against Lp adversaries.
Approach Main Methodologies Verification Robust Scalability Base MethodComplete Prob. L∞ L2 L1 L0 Other Training
Planet [38] Branch, LP X 1 Synthetic
BaB [17] MILP, LP, Branch X 2 Synthetic
BaBSR [15] LP, Branch X 2 Synthetic
Reluplex [60] Branch, LP X X MNIST
Reluval [118] LP, IBP, Branch X X MNIST
Neurify [117] LP, Branch X X MNIST
DLV [52] Search X 2 ImageNet
Sherlock [31] MILP X X MNIST
ChengMIP [21] MILP X X X MNIST
Reachability [75] MILP X X MNIST
Bounded MILP [111] MILP X X CIFAR-10
Stability [127] MILP Only CIFAR-10
AI2 [45] LP, Branch X X CIFAR-10
GeoCert [58] Lipschitz, LP X X X X MNIST
Charon [1] LP, relax, learned X MNIST
DiffAI [78] LP, relax X X CIFAR-10
DeepZ [101] LP, relax X CIFAR-10 Improve from [78]
DeepPoly [103] LP, relax X CIFAR-10 Extend from [101]
RefineZono [104] LP, MILP, relax X CIFAR-10 Extend from [101, 103]
k-ReLU [102] LP, relax X CIFAR-10 Extend from [104]
Fast-Lin [121] LP, relax X X X CIFAR-10
CROWN [131] LP, relax X X X CIFAR-10 Extend from [121]
CNN-Cert [10] LP, relax X X X CIFAR-10 Extend from [131]
LP-Full [121, 96] LP X X MNIST
C2V [110] LP, relax X CIFAR-10
CROWN-IBP [134] LP, IBP, relax X X CIFAR-10 Combine [131] and [47]
COLT [7] LP, relax Only CIFAR-10
MMR [26] LP, relax Only CIFAR-10
MMR-Universal [25] LP, relax Only CIFAR-10
IBP [47] IBP X X CIFAR-10
WK [122] LP, dual, relax X X MNIST
WK+ [123] LP, dual, relax Only CIFAR-10
D-LP [34] LP, dual, relax X CIFAR-10
PVT [33] IBP, dual, relax, learned X X CIFAR-10
Robustra [72] LP, dual, relax Only CIFAR-10
Mixtrain [116] LP, dual, relax Only CIFAR-10
Op-norm [106] Lipschitz X CIFAR-10
CL [51] Lipschitz X X X X CIFAR-10
Fast-Lip [121] Lipschitz X X X CIFAR-10
RecurJac [133] Lipschitz X X X CIFAR-10
CRC/CRT [105] Curvature X 3 X MNIST
SDP Train [90] SDP X X Synthetic
SDP Verify [91] SDP X MNIST Extend from [90]
LMIVerify [41] SDP, dual X CIFAR-10
PGD-SDP [35] SDP, relax X CIFAR-10
DP [65] DP, Rand. Smooth X X X X ImageNet
Re´nyi-divergence [71] Rand. Smooth X X X X ImageNet
Rand. Smooth [24] Rand. Smooth X X X ImageNet
Unlabeled [19] Rand. Smooth X Only ImageNet
Adversarial [95] Rand. Smooth X Only ImageNet
MACER [129] Rand. Smooth X Only ImageNet
`0-Lee [66] Rand. Smooth X X X ImageNet
f-divergence [36] Rand. Smooth X X X X X X ImageNet
`1-Teng [108] Rand. Smooth X X X ImageNet
ADRE [43] Rand. Smooth X X X ImageNet
Zhang-Dual [130] Rand. Smooth X X X X X ImageNet
All Shapes [128] Rand. Smooth X X X X X ImageNet
Low Rank enforcement [5] Rand. Smooth X X X 4 X CIFAR-10
Consistency [54] Rand. Smooth X Only ImageNet
In “Verification” column, “Complete” means whether the verification
approach is complete or not; “Prob.” means whether the approach is
under probabilistic setting or not; each “Lp” column means whether
the approach provides novel verification approach with experimental
results under corresponding Lp adversary. In “Main Methodologies”
column:
- Branch: use branch-and-bound strategy.
- Relax: further relaxation on the ReLU linear bounds or SDP.
- Dual: derive from dual problem.
- DP: differential privacy.
- Rand. Smooth: probabilistic approach based on randomized models.
- Learned: the verification approach is learned from data statistics.
In “Other” column under “Verification”:
1. Customized perturbation set, such as noise value differences
in adjacent pixels to be ≤ 0.05 (used in [38]);
2. Simple properties, such as limited number of changed neuron
inputs in certain hidden layer used in [52].
Scalability ranking: Synthetic < MNIST < CIFAR-10 <
ImageNet.
Note that some approaches may be able to scale up to higher
level, but not stated in their papers.
3. Only support smooth activation functions such as sigmoid,
but not ReLU.
4. L∞ verification on projected low-dimensional space.
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TABLE VI: Statistics of the models used in the evaluation of deterministic verification approaches. In the “Structure” column,
the rightarrow → stands for the connection from previous to the next layer, “Flatten” stands for the flatten layer, “FC” stands
for the fully connected layer, and “Conv” stands for the convolutional layer.
Dataset Model # Neurons # Parameters Structure Source
MNIST FCNNA 50 16, 330 Flatten → 3 FCs 2× [20] from [121, 133]
FCNNB 310 99, 710 Flatten → 4 FCs 3× [100] enlarged from [121, 133]
FCNNC 7, 178 7, 111, 690 Flatten → 8 FCs 7× [1024] from [121, 131]
CNNA 4, 814 166, 406 2 Convs → Flatten → 2 FCs Conv-Small in [122, 123]
CNNB 24, 042 833, 786 4 Convs → Flatten → 2 FCs Half sized Conv-Large in [123]
CNNC 48, 074 1, 974, 762 4 Convs → Flatten → 3 FCs Conv-Large in [123]
CNND 176, 138 13, 314, 634 5 Convs → Flatten → 2 FCs Double sized Conv-Large in [123]
CIFAR-10 FCNNA 50 62, 090 Flatten → 3 FCs 2× [20] from [121, 133]
FCNNB 310 328, 510 Flatten → 4 FCs 3× [100] enlarged from [121, 133]
FCNNC 7, 178 9, 454, 602 Flatten → 8 FCs 7× [1024] from [121, 131]
CNNA 6, 254 214, 918 2 Convs → Flatten → 2 FCs Conv-Small in [122, 123]
CNNB 31, 242 1, 079, 834 4 Convs → Flatten → 2 FCs Half sized Conv-Large in [123]
CNNC 62, 474 2, 466, 858 4 Convs → Flatten → 3 FCs Conv-Large in [123]
CNND 229, 898 17, 247, 946 5 Convs → Flatten → 2 FCs Double sized Conv-Large in [123]
TABLE VII: Clean accuracy and empirical robust accuracy for each set of weights. The clean accuracy is measured on the
whole original test set. The empirical robust accuracy is measured on the inputs generated by PGD attacks from the whole
original test set. For reg weights, due to low robustness, we do not report empirical robust accuracy (which is typically close
to zero).
On MNIST: for adv1 and cadv1, the adversarial examples are bounded by radius  = 0.1 under L∞ metric; for adv3
and cadv3, bounded by radius  = 0.3. On CIFAR-10: for adv2 and cadv2, bounded by radius  = 2/255; for adv8 and
cadv8, bounded by radius  = 8/255.
Dataset Model Weights Clean Acc. Empirical Rob. Acc. Dataset Model Weights Clean Acc. Empirical Rob. Acc.
MNIST
FCNNA
reg 93.63% /
CIFAR-10
FCNNA
reg 38.46% /
adv1 93.36% 78.39% adv2 41.17% 39.49%
cadv1 88.35% 80.99% cadv2 38.97% 38.71%
adv3 76.77% 31.67% adv8 34.13% 31.36%
cadv3 45.79% 41.35% cadv8 30.59% 30.36%
FCNNB
reg 96.12% /
FCNNB
reg 41.76% /
adv1 97.12% 85.18% adv2 44.31% 42.99%
cadv1 95.23% 90.67% cadv2 44.18% 43.83%
adv3 89.96% 33.30% adv8 37.68% 34.01%
cadv3 76.21% 69.90% cadv8 32.05% 31.40%
FCNNC
reg 95.05% /
FCNNC
reg 46.37% /
adv1 98.00% 87.40% adv2 36.19% 35.87%
cadv1 96.89% 93.43% cadv2 46.34% 45.42%
adv3 83.27% 33.31% adv8 25.21% 25.87%
cadv3 35.87% 34.08% cadv8 30.30% 29.59%
CNNA
reg 98.48% /
CNNA
reg 59.45% /
adv1 99.01% 95.48% adv2 60.40% 57.39%
cadv1 98.52% 97.18% cadv2 54.78% 54.17%
adv3 98.20% 86.06% adv8 49.42% 41.87%
cadv3 96.26% 93.06% cadv8 40.51% 39.93%
CNNB
reg 98.85% /
CNNB
reg 65.65% /
adv1 99.33% 96.09% adv2 68.66% 64.01%
cadv1 98.87% 98.12% cadv2 58.81% 58.76%
adv3 99.01% 92.84% adv8 55.15% 45.35%
cadv3 98.14% 95.88% cadv8 40.05% 39.36%
CNNC
reg 98.85% /
CNNC
reg 58.60% /
adv1 99.24% 96.35% adv2 65.59% 62.05%
cadv1 98.83% 98.41% cadv2 59.46% 59.25%
adv3 99.16% 93.47% adv8 54.01% 45.91%
cadv3 98.11% 96.10% cadv8 40.11% 39.50%
CNND
reg 99.20% /
CNND
reg 83.53% /
adv1 99.37% 97.64% adv2 83.65% 76.41%
cadv1 99.13% 98.50% cadv2 60.74% 59.88%
adv3 99.38% 95.09% adv8 72.25% 53.86%
cadv3 98.58% 96.72% cadv8 40.61% 39.94%
used: normal models; empirical defense models; and robustly
trained models. All models are trained to reach their expected
accuracy or robustness. The model structures and statistics of
number of neurons is shown in Table VI. The model accuracy
on original test set, and empirical robust accuracy under the
PGD attack, is shown in Table VII.
Evaluation protocol. We present the performance of verifica-
tion approaches by their robust accuracy and average certified
robustness radius with respect to L∞ radius .
Robust Accuracy: When measuring robust accuracy, the
chosen radius  for verification corresponds to the radius
trained for defense. The robust accuracy is defined as
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robacc :=
# samples verified to be robust
# number of all samples
. On each dataset,
we uniformly sample 100 test set samples as the fixed set
for evaluation. We further limit the running time to 60 s per
instance and count timeout instances as “non-robust”.
We also report the robust accuracy under empirical at-
tack (PGD attack), which gives an upper bound of robust
accuracy, so we can estimate the gap between certified robust
accuracy and accuracy of existing attack.
Average Certified Robustness Radius: We also evaluate the
verification approaches by measuring their average certified
robustness radius. The average certified robustness radius (r¯)
stands for the average L∞ radius the verification approach can
verify on the given subset of test set samples. We use the same
uniformly sampled sets as in robust accuracy evaluation. To
determine the best certified radius of each verification approach,
we conduct a binary search process due to the monotonicity.
Specifically, we do binary search on interval [0, 0.5] because
the largest possible radius is 0.5 for [0, 1] bounded input. If
current radius mid is verified to be robust, we update current
best by mid and let l ← mid, if current radius mid cannot
be verified, we let r ← mid, until we reach the precision
10−2 on MNIST or 10−3 on CIFAR-10, or time is up. For
the evaluation of average certified robustness radius, since it
involves multiple evaluations because of binary search, we
limit the running time to 120 s per input and record the highest
certified radius it has been verified before the time is used
up. The average certified robustness radius is evaluated on the
same subset of test set samples as used for robust accuracy
evaluation.
We also report the smallest radius of adversarial samples
found by empirical attack (PGD attack), which gives an upper
bound of certified robustness radius for us to estimate the gap.
Throughout the evaluation, we use 100-step PGD attack with
step size equals to /50 where  is the constrained L∞ attack
radius.
D. Full Results
We present the full results as below. Besides robust accuracy
and average certified robustness radius, we also report the
running time per instance for each approach on both tasks
respectively. Note that for robust accuracy evaluation, the
verification is run once per instance with time limit 60 s;
while for average certified robustness radius evaluation, the
verification will be run multiple times due to the binary search,
with overall time limit 120 s.
We summarize the references of corresponding result tables
as below.
Dataset Evaluation Type Results Table Running Time Table
MNIST Robust Accuracy (robacc) Table VIII Table IXAverage certified robustness radius (r¯) Table X Table XI
CIFAR-10 Robust Accuracy (robacc) Table II
4 Table XII
Average certified robustness radius (r¯) Table XIII Table XIV
Remarks.
Generally, the tendency on MNIST is the same as that on
CIFAR-10.
From these additional evaluations of average certified
robustness radius, we can find that the average radius has
better precision than robust accuracy. For example, on small
models such as FNNA and FNNB, if measured by robust
accuracy, the complete verification approaches and some
linear relaxation-based approaches have almost the same
precision (see table II, the results of Bounded MILP, AI2,
CROWN, and CNN-Cert). However, if measured by average
certified robustness radius, we can observe that complete
verification approaches can certify much larger radius since
they do not use any relaxations (see table XIII, the result that
Bounded MILP ≈ AI2 > CROWN ≈ CNN-Cert).
From the running time statistics, we further observe that
a main cause of the failing cases (i.e., 0 robust accuracy
or certified radius) for these approaches is the excessive
verification time. In particular, since the evaluation of average
certified robustness radius requires multiple times of verification
for each instance, it suffers more severely from long verification
time.
4Appeared in main text.
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TABLE VIII: Robust accuracy on MNIST models certified by different deterministic verification approaches. The verification is
under L∞ adversary with radius  (specified in table). We include accuracy under PGD attack to serve as the upper bound of
robust accuracy, and the clean accuracy. The bolded numbers mark the highest ones among verification approaches.
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
 = 0.02 clean clean clean clean clean clean clean
Bounded MILP 80% 84% 0% 44% 0% 0% 0%
AI2 80% 86% 0% 89% 90% 0% 0%
LP-Full 70% 68% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DeepPoly 79% 85% 0% 89% 90% 0% 0%
Fast-Lin 68% 56% 0% 72% 28% 5% 0%
CROWN 79% 85% 0% 89% 90% 0% 0%
CNN-Cert 70% 67% 0% 73% 44% 0% 0%
CROWN-IBP 77% 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0%
IBP 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WK 68% 56% 0% 72% 28% 5% 0%
k-ReLU 79% 85% 0% 89% 0% 0% 0%
RefineZono 79% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SDPVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LMIVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Op-norm 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FastLip 60% 4% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0%
RecurJac 70% 52% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0%
PGD Upper Bound 80% 86% 85% 92% 95% 93% 97%
Clean Acc. 89% 92% 95% 99% 100% 100% 100%
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
 = 0.1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1
Bounded MILP 70% 68% 0% 85% 0% 67% 0% 95% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
AI2 70% 68% 1% 85% 0% 52% 6% 95% 1% 93% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LP-Full 8% 46% 0% 57% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DeepPoly 47% 64% 4% 72% 0% 52% 32% 93% 2% 93% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fast-Lin 5% 35% 0% 36% 0% 0% 0% 90% 0% 89% 0% 86% 0% 0%
CROWN 47% 64% 4% 72% 0% 52% 32% 93% 2% 93% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CNN-Cert 5% 36% 0% 44% 0% 0% 0% 92% 0% 93% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CROWN-IBP 2% 67% 0% 76% 0% 73% 0% 93% 0% 94% 0% 88% 0% 94%
IBP 0% 68% 0% 85% 0% 80% 0% 95% 0% 91% 0% 89% 0% 90%
WK 5% 35% 0% 36% 0% 0% 0% 90% 0% 89% 0% 86% 0% 1%
k-ReLU 51% 68% 4% 85% 0% 0% 3% 95% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
RefineZono 49% 63% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SDPVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LMIVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Op-norm 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FastLip 0% 30% 0% 31% 0% 2% 0% 86% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
RecurJac 2% 30% 0% 31% 0% 0% 0% 85% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PGD Upper Bound 71% 69% 80% 85% 82% 89% 94% 95% 95% 97% 95% 96% 97% 99%
Clean Acc. 92% 88% 97% 97% 98% 96% 100% 99% 100% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100%
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
 = 0.3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3
Bounded MILP 6% 25% 0% 54% 0% 7% 0% 88% 0% 84% 0% 0% 0% 0%
AI2 6% 25% 0% 54% 0% 16% 0% 73% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LP-Full 0% 15% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DeepPoly 0% 23% 0% 27% 0% 16% 0% 40% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fast-Lin 0% 4% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CROWN 0% 23% 0% 27% 0% 16% 0% 40% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CNN-Cert 0% 13% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 39% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CROWN-IBP 0% 23% 0% 45% 0% 20% 0% 76% 0% 71% 0% 75% 0% 65%
IBP 0% 25% 0% 54% 0% 22% 0% 88% 0% 85% 0% 87% 0% 89%
WK 0% 4% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
k-ReLU 0% 25% 0% 54% 0% 0% 0% 57% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
RefineZono 0% 21% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SDPVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
LMIVerify 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Op-norm 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FastLip 0% 1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
RecurJac 0% 1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
PGD Upper Bound 19% 26% 26% 64% 26% 26% 81% 90% 91% 94% 90% 93% 92% 94%
Clean Acc. 75% 37% 88% 76% 78% 28% 97% 95% 100% 98% 99% 98% 100% 98%
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TABLE IX: Average running time for single-instance robustness verification in seconds per correctly-predicted instance on
MNIST models of different verification approaches. The verification is under L∞ adversary with  (specified in table) radius.
We stop the execution when time exceeds 60 s per instance. We include running time of PGD attack and normal inference as
the reference.
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
clean clean clean clean clean clean clean
Bounded MILP 0.37 12.67 60.00 54.28 60.00 60.00 60.00
AI2 0.09 1.09 60.00 7.92 48.89 60.00 60.00
LP-Full 0.41 15.22 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
DeepPoly 0.03 0.25 60.00 2.45 49.04 60.00 60.00
Fast-Lin 0.03 0.03 1.71 0.35 4.70 15.95 60.00
CROWN 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.13 60.00 60.00
CNN-Cert 0.12 0.43 60.00 1.13 28.40 59.67 60.00
CROWN-IBP 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
IBP 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
WK 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.08 60.00
k-ReLU 12.49 26.05 60.00 30.49 60.00 60.00 60.00
RefineZono 3.40 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
SDPVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LMIVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 60.00
FastLip 0.20 0.20 1.68 5.81 25.47 54.26 60.00
RecurJac 0.81 2.25 43.29 50.35 60.00 60.00 60.00
PGD Attack 0.26 0.30 0.42 0.33 0.43 0.46 0.51
Normal Inference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1
Bounded MILP 0.73 0.28 60.00 1.32 60.00 53.35 60.00 6.86 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
AI2 0.52 0.23 59.38 1.12 60.00 31.50 56.49 2.61 59.80 25.03 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LP-Full 0.43 0.35 23.59 9.57 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
DeepPoly 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.15 60.00 7.97 1.61 1.34 41.59 23.53 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Fast-Lin 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 2.06 1.71 0.39 0.41 5.63 4.80 17.31 19.13 60.00 60.00
CROWN 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.13 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
CNN-Cert 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.31 60.00 60.00 0.21 1.35 4.18 36.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
CROWN-IBP 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
IBP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
WK 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.21 0.09 60.00 59.41
k-ReLU 12.87 11.92 34.56 38.43 60.00 60.00 59.35 34.48 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
RefineZono 7.27 14.51 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
SDPVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LMIVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 60.00 60.00
FastLip 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.12 1.17 6.04 2.52 5.51 20.05 60.00 46.69 60.00 60.00 60.00
RecurJac 0.36 0.35 0.88 1.77 24.96 57.75 28.61 49.91 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
PGD Attack 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.42 0.48 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54
Normal Inference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3
Bounded MILP 0.63 0.30 60.00 1.39 60.00 52.52 60.00 5.61 60.00 50.35 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
AI2 0.72 0.29 60.00 1.72 60.00 23.66 60.00 27.46 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LP-Full 0.49 0.39 22.97 12.75 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
DeepPoly 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.15 60.00 5.14 1.75 1.28 40.27 27.57 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Fast-Lin 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 2.14 1.96 0.34 0.44 5.66 5.28 18.63 20.04 60.00 60.00
CROWN 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.13 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
CNN-Cert 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.12 60.00 60.00 0.17 0.89 4.20 5.91 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
CROWN-IBP 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
IBP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
WK 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.38 0.19 60.00 60.00
k-ReLU 12.37 12.78 45.15 44.37 60.00 60.00 60.00 48.59 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
RefineZono 12.08 18.52 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
SDPVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LMIVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 60.00 60.00
FastLip 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.07 1.87 1.91 2.04 3.11 8.27 50.14 46.81 60.00 60.00 60.00
RecurJac 0.14 0.31 0.36 1.28 10.81 29.23 12.47 38.94 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
PGD Attack 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.43 0.49 0.33 0.38 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.54
Normal Inference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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TABLE X: Average certified robustness radius on MNIST models certified by different deterministic verification approaches.
The verification is under L∞ adversary. We include radius of adversarial example found by PGD attack to serve as the upper
bound. The bolded numbers mark the highest ones among verification approaches.
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
clean clean clean clean clean clean clean
Bounded MILP 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AI2 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LP-Full 0.027 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DeepPoly 0.045 0.035 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fast-Lin 0.026 0.018 0.000 0.021 0.014 0.009 0.000
CROWN 0.045 0.035 0.005 0.039 0.030 0.000 0.000
CNN-Cert 0.027 0.020 0.000 0.022 0.015 0.000 0.000
CROWN-IBP 0.033 0.006 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
IBP 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
WK 0.026 0.018 0.000 0.021 0.014 0.009 0.000
k-ReLU 0.046 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RefineZono 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SDPVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LMIVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Op-norm 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FastLip 0.020 0.008 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000
RecurJac 0.030 0.021 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD Upper Bound 0.057 0.060 0.046 0.073 0.087 0.090 0.103
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1
Bounded MILP 0.135 0.131 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AI2 0.135 0.131 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LP-Full 0.063 0.097 0.040 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DeepPoly 0.095 0.120 0.064 0.118 0.000 0.096 0.086 0.152 0.008 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fast-Lin 0.060 0.083 0.036 0.080 0.007 0.056 0.061 0.142 0.051 0.149 0.041 0.138 0.000 0.000
CROWN 0.095 0.120 0.064 0.118 0.019 0.096 0.086 0.152 0.075 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CNN-Cert 0.062 0.084 0.039 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.150 0.056 0.161 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CROWN-IBP 0.055 0.123 0.009 0.135 0.000 0.133 0.030 0.154 0.001 0.176 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.174
IBP 0.011 0.128 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.143 0.005 0.154 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.168
WK 0.060 0.083 0.036 0.080 0.007 0.056 0.061 0.142 0.051 0.149 0.041 0.139 0.000 0.000
k-ReLU 0.100 0.129 0.014 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RefineZono 0.097 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SDPVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LMIVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Op-norm 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FastLip 0.041 0.078 0.016 0.074 0.000 0.052 0.032 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RecurJac 0.060 0.081 0.035 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD Upper Bound 0.145 0.157 0.155 0.190 0.151 0.213 0.163 0.194 0.168 0.233 0.169 0.278 0.181 0.320
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3
Bounded MILP 0.157 0.256 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.230 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000
AI2 0.157 0.256 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.232 0.000 0.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LP-Full 0.079 0.229 0.049 0.217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DeepPoly 0.119 0.239 0.076 0.224 0.000 0.228 0.174 0.254 0.105 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fast-Lin 0.074 0.202 0.043 0.151 0.008 0.033 0.117 0.221 0.106 0.174 0.083 0.143 0.000 0.000
CROWN 0.119 0.239 0.076 0.224 0.021 0.228 0.174 0.254 0.141 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CNN-Cert 0.078 0.210 0.048 0.189 0.000 0.000 0.130 0.253 0.120 0.179 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CROWN-IBP 0.069 0.239 0.005 0.256 0.000 0.288 0.074 0.283 0.000 0.272 0.000 0.277 0.000 0.272
IBP 0.008 0.256 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.295 0.018 0.294 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.299
WK 0.074 0.202 0.043 0.151 0.008 0.033 0.117 0.221 0.106 0.174 0.085 0.143 0.000 0.000
k-ReLU 0.125 0.256 0.002 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RefineZono 0.120 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SDPVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LMIVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Op-norm 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FastLip 0.053 0.189 0.015 0.153 0.000 0.043 0.067 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RecurJac 0.072 0.193 0.039 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD Upper Bound 0.199 0.309 0.216 0.331 0.231 0.427 0.308 0.302 0.313 0.318 0.328 0.316 0.366 0.325
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TABLE XI: Average running time for robustness radius computation in seconds per correctly-predicted instance on MNIST
models of different verification approaches. The verification is on L∞ ball. We stop the execution when time exceeds 120 s per
instance. We include running time of PGD attack as the reference.
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
clean clean clean clean clean clean clean
Bounded MILP 3.14 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
AI2 3.95 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LP-Full 2.63 113.84 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
DeepPoly 0.17 1.50 120.00 13.42 120.00 120.00 120.00
Fast-Lin 0.04 0.17 12.30 2.04 32.25 103.94 120.00
CROWN 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.80 120.00 120.00
CNN-Cert 0.11 1.19 120.00 3.23 75.62 120.00 120.00
CROWN-IBP 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.08
IBP 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
WK 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.08 0.32 1.06 120.00
k-ReLU 70.72 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RefineZono 32.98 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
SDPVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LMIVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 120.00
FastLip 0.15 0.57 9.95 19.23 111.50 120.00 120.00
RecurJac 6.81 29.75 120.00 114.36 120.00 120.00 120.00
PGD Attack 1.61 1.81 2.59 2.03 2.68 2.85 3.13
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1 adv1 cadv1
Bounded MILP 4.97 2.39 120.00 14.06 120.00 120.00 120.00 118.88 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
AI2 5.28 6.44 120.00 39.72 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LP-Full 2.77 2.33 107.16 73.58 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
DeepPoly 0.16 0.12 1.50 0.99 120.00 65.62 9.55 8.65 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Fast-Lin 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.17 11.18 9.15 2.11 2.62 32.73 28.51 96.23 119.36 120.00 120.00
CROWN 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.80 0.80 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CNN-Cert 0.16 0.16 1.48 1.70 120.00 120.00 4.09 4.69 94.97 115.68 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CROWN-IBP 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
IBP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
WK 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.33 0.23 1.03 0.77 120.00 120.00
k-ReLU 65.10 69.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RefineZono 56.38 100.87 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
SDPVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LMIVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 120.00 120.00
FastLip 0.16 0.16 0.67 0.69 8.59 46.72 20.61 25.84 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RecurJac 5.87 5.62 29.77 28.10 120.00 120.00 119.21 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
PGD Attack 1.70 2.04 1.91 2.25 2.67 2.96 2.11 2.33 2.74 2.97 2.85 3.21 3.16 3.40
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3 adv3 cadv3
Bounded MILP 4.75 2.53 120.00 7.77 120.00 120.00 120.00 116.93 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
AI2 4.96 3.74 120.00 12.73 120.00 117.14 120.00 118.62 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LP-Full 2.51 2.39 104.91 63.49 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
DeepPoly 0.16 0.13 1.76 0.94 120.00 32.34 10.85 8.12 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Fast-Lin 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.15 11.21 8.92 1.78 2.40 29.16 28.74 115.24 106.29 120.00 120.00
CROWN 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.80 0.80 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CNN-Cert 0.16 0.16 1.41 1.95 120.00 120.00 4.71 5.14 112.83 117.19 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CROWN-IBP 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
IBP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
WK 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.57 0.78 120.00 120.00
k-ReLU 64.68 63.76 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RefineZono 79.13 21.92 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
SDPVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LMIVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 120.00 120.00
FastLip 0.16 0.19 0.62 0.74 9.15 38.31 31.29 25.23 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RecurJac 5.37 5.92 29.40 30.22 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
PGD Attack 1.81 2.38 2.00 2.23 2.79 3.08 2.10 2.24 2.71 2.82 2.92 3.10 3.25 3.32
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TABLE XII: Average running time for single-instance robustness verification in seconds per correctly-predicted instance on
CIFAR-10 models of different verification approaches. The verification is under L∞ adversary with  (specified in table) radius.
We stop the execution when time exceeds 60 s per instance. We include running time of PGD attack and normal inference as
the reference.
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
clean clean clean clean clean clean clean
Bounded MILP 0.93 10.70 60.00 50.60 60.00 60.00 60.00
AI2 0.07 2.09 60.00 7.69 57.57 60.00 60.00
LP-Full 0.71 33.68 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
DeepPoly 0.05 0.53 60.00 2.55 41.52 60.00 60.00
Fast-Lin 0.03 0.02 1.03 1.49 11.07 32.62 60.00
CROWN 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.32 60.00 60.00
CNN-Cert 0.19 0.71 60.00 1.43 35.36 59.69 60.00
CROWN-IBP 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
IBP 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
WK 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.10 54.42
k-ReLU 5.83 20.91 60.00 31.63 60.00 60.00 60.00
RefineZono 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
SDPVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LMIVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 60.00
FastLip 0.09 0.43 1.35 21.28 49.81 60.00 60.00
RecurJac 1.56 5.67 60.00 57.99 60.00 60.00 60.00
PGD Attack 0.23 0.27 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.39 0.54
Normal Inference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2
Bounded MILP 1.24 1.05 32.64 4.87 60.00 60.00 60.00 4.70 60.00 30.27 60.00 59.55 60.00 60.00
AI2 1.99 1.06 5.16 7.01 60.00 45.69 23.65 4.81 54.19 27.01 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LP-Full 0.74 0.77 34.64 26.08 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
DeepPoly 0.05 0.04 0.56 0.45 60.00 41.60 2.49 1.10 43.68 17.67 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Fast-Lin 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 1.36 1.36 1.48 1.45 11.77 10.92 33.87 34.73 60.00 60.00
CROWN 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.33 0.47 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
CNN-Cert 0.05 0.17 0.67 0.70 10.71 55.88 1.18 1.26 18.84 33.65 42.77 58.12 60.00 60.00
CROWN-IBP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
IBP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
WK 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.09 60.00 0.40
k-ReLU 7.08 7.33 34.73 25.81 60.00 60.00 60.00 26.78 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
RefineZono 60.00 26.05 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
SDPVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LMIVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 60.00 60.00
FastLip 0.06 0.09 0.30 0.30 1.30 11.06 11.90 11.24 37.44 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
RecurJac 0.90 1.43 4.83 5.14 60.00 60.00 59.51 59.17 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
PGD Attack 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.45 0.37 0.46 0.55 0.64
Normal Inference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8
Bounded MILP 3.34 0.95 59.44 3.85 60.00 58.94 60.00 4.55 60.00 27.30 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
AI2 3.68 1.72 47.08 10.74 60.00 36.69 49.39 4.29 60.00 37.84 60.00 57.95 60.00 60.00
LP-Full 1.02 0.82 51.35 20.84 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
DeepPoly 0.05 0.04 0.57 0.29 60.00 25.26 1.95 0.97 38.23 15.16 60.00 57.25 60.00 60.00
Fast-Lin 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 1.44 1.58 1.49 1.24 11.77 10.14 38.27 34.86 60.00 60.00
CROWN 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.33 0.46 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
CNN-Cert 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.50 10.94 42.49 0.48 1.03 4.11 21.88 14.79 41.58 60.00 60.00
CROWN-IBP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
IBP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
WK 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.40 0.10 60.00 5.71
k-ReLU 10.14 7.66 57.61 34.26 60.00 60.00 60.00 32.65 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
RefineZono 60.00 7.77 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
SDPVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
LMIVerify 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 60.00 60.00
FastLip 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.19 1.44 9.25 8.40 8.36 28.66 59.01 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
RecurJac 0.74 0.90 2.81 4.04 48.90 59.14 57.64 58.93 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
PGD Attack 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.39 0.29 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.47 0.55 0.65
Normal Inference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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TABLE XIII: Average certified robustness radius divided by 255 on CIFAR-10 models certified by different deterministic
verification approaches. The verification is under L∞ adversary. We include radius of adversarial example found by PGD attack
to serve as the upper bound. The bolded numbers mark the highest ones among verification approaches.
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
clean clean clean clean clean clean clean
Bounded MILP 5.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AI2 5.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LP-Full 3.966 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DeepPoly 3.984 2.888 0.000 1.669 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fast-Lin 3.723 2.596 0.812 1.503 0.637 0.000 0.000
CROWN 3.984 2.888 1.065 1.669 0.765 0.000 0.000
CNN-Cert 3.893 2.819 0.000 1.625 0.699 0.000 0.000
CROWN-IBP 2.187 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IBP 1.026 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
WK 2.818 1.738 0.000 0.734 0.000 0.000 0.000
k-ReLU 4.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RefineZono 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SDPVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LMIVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Op-norm 0.183 0.071 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
FastLip 2.988 1.256 0.000 0.599 0.000 0.000 0.000
RecurJac 3.596 2.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD Upper Bound 5.679 5.521 6.037 3.482 2.560 4.187 1.819
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2
Bounded MILP 6.429 9.301 0.000 5.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AI2 6.033 9.301 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LP-Full 4.930 8.747 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DeepPoly 5.009 7.408 3.683 4.720 0.000 0.173 2.601 4.682 0.000 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fast-Lin 4.714 7.103 3.211 4.036 0.655 3.080 2.269 4.079 1.294 2.486 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CROWN 5.009 7.408 3.683 4.720 0.847 4.071 2.601 4.682 1.551 3.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CNN-Cert 4.856 7.321 3.575 4.911 0.000 0.000 2.532 4.578 1.339 2.702 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CROWN-IBP 2.717 7.863 0.000 5.004 0.000 3.936 0.000 5.415 0.000 3.889 0.000 3.909 0.000 3.551
IBP 0.826 8.324 0.016 5.027 0.000 3.508 0.028 5.958 0.000 4.611 0.000 4.411 0.000 4.233
WK 3.939 7.103 2.407 4.036 0.000 3.080 1.476 4.079 0.423 2.486 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
k-ReLU 5.184 8.871 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RefineZono 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SDPVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LMIVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Op-norm 0.174 0.011 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FastLip 3.696 6.319 1.359 3.399 0.000 2.404 0.742 3.523 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RecurJac 4.550 6.375 2.765 3.509 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD Upper Bound 7.856 13.485 8.581 10.864 9.292 9.181 7.185 11.432 6.629 10.301 7.901 9.578 5.472 9.981
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8
Bounded MILP 12.134 22.428 0.000 23.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.953 0.000 1.328 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AI2 10.972 22.364 0.000 13.613 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LP-Full 8.542 21.593 0.000 10.625 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DeepPoly 8.882 20.870 5.398 15.780 0.000 6.411 5.156 11.617 0.000 7.294 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fast-Lin 7.825 17.946 4.637 11.422 0.881 9.259 4.471 9.171 2.396 6.469 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CROWN 8.882 20.870 5.398 15.780 1.226 11.615 5.156 11.617 2.890 8.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CNN-Cert 8.444 20.163 5.169 14.900 0.000 2.452 4.952 11.601 2.523 7.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CROWN-IBP 5.614 21.014 0.108 20.603 0.000 14.852 0.589 15.012 0.000 14.604 0.000 13.934 0.000 11.710
IBP 1.517 22.276 0.074 22.271 0.000 15.880 0.277 19.115 0.000 18.770 0.000 18.920 0.000 15.553
WK 7.003 17.946 3.877 11.422 0.000 9.259 3.577 9.171 1.541 6.469 0.000 5.137 0.000 0.000
k-ReLU 9.304 22.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RefineZono 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SDPVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LMIVerify 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Op-norm 0.117 0.020 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FastLip 6.309 18.002 1.992 10.019 0.000 8.799 2.173 8.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RecurJac 7.539 18.002 3.971 10.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD Upper Bound 15.500 35.723 15.783 35.278 19.558 25.796 15.219 31.399 13.128 34.687 14.913 37.088 12.040 28.578
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TABLE XIV: Average running time for robustness radius computation in seconds per correctly-predicted instance on CIFAR-10
models of different verification approaches. The verification is on L∞ ball. We stop the execution when time exceeds 120 s per
instance. We include running time of PGD attack as the reference.
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
clean clean clean clean clean clean clean
Bounded MILP 23.76 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
AI2 40.75 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LP-Full 8.96 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
DeepPoly 0.40 5.26 120.00 24.44 120.00 120.00 120.00
Fast-Lin 0.05 0.22 12.19 13.14 112.11 120.00 120.00
CROWN 0.03 0.05 0.43 0.20 2.96 120.00 120.00
CNN-Cert 0.24 3.05 120.00 5.03 102.79 120.00 120.00
CROWN-IBP 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
IBP 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08
WK 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.11 0.70 120.00 120.00
k-ReLU 100.18 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RefineZono 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
SDPVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LMIVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 120.00
FastLip 0.41 1.98 13.48 77.41 120.00 120.00 120.00
RecurJac 5.72 26.99 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
PGD Attack 2.54 2.87 3.68 2.89 3.48 3.69 4.81
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2 adv2 cadv2
Bounded MILP 26.48 16.01 120.00 117.08 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
AI2 59.12 48.56 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LP-Full 8.89 8.65 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
DeepPoly 0.41 0.36 5.07 3.91 120.00 120.00 22.75 11.02 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Fast-Lin 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.27 12.10 14.38 13.27 13.08 108.53 96.77 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CROWN 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.43 0.41 0.20 0.20 3.00 4.26 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CNN-Cert 0.25 0.34 3.17 2.66 120.00 120.00 5.60 5.75 113.73 116.81 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CROWN-IBP 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08
IBP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10
WK 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.28 0.11 0.13 0.79 1.35 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
k-ReLU 91.47 93.79 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RefineZono 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
SDPVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LMIVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 120.00 120.00
FastLip 0.42 0.40 1.88 1.74 16.78 65.67 99.47 65.69 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RecurJac 5.83 6.41 27.72 28.83 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
PGD Attack 2.79 3.64 3.04 3.60 4.15 4.26 3.19 4.13 3.79 4.57 4.01 4.73 5.05 6.63
FCNNA FCNNB FCNNC CNNA CNNB CNNC CNND
adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8 adv8 cadv8
Bounded MILP 36.26 19.76 120.00 89.66 120.00 120.00 120.00 106.38 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
AI2 89.11 68.36 120.00 117.86 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LP-Full 9.56 8.43 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
DeepPoly 0.47 0.38 5.10 2.87 120.00 120.00 18.33 9.65 120.00 119.79 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Fast-Lin 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.23 12.23 12.47 12.97 13.05 106.36 92.09 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CROWN 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.43 0.41 0.20 0.20 3.00 4.15 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CNN-Cert 0.28 0.27 3.56 3.52 120.00 120.00 6.38 6.27 112.92 118.42 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
CROWN-IBP 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08
IBP 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09
WK 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.24 0.27 0.10 0.13 0.74 1.19 120.00 1.61 120.00 120.00
k-ReLU 96.06 101.99 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RefineZono 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
SDPVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
LMIVerify 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Op-norm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 120.00 120.00
FastLip 0.45 0.45 2.05 1.79 17.55 86.96 102.45 70.16 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
RecurJac 6.91 7.11 30.71 34.06 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
PGD Attack 3.41 4.58 3.80 5.17 4.95 5.52 4.04 5.66 4.48 6.73 4.58 6.66 5.67 8.05
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